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 Abstract 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) from emerging economies 
(EEs) to developed economies (DEs) have recently experienced a 
phenomenal growth. CBMA is a fast and direct way to acquire advanced 
strategic assets from DEs by multinational enterprises from EEs (EMNEs) 
in order to improve their competitive advantages. What factors explain this 
strategic decision and what is the performance consequence? Using the 
institution-based view (IBV) as a theoretical lens, this thesis consists of 
three empirical research studies.  
 
The first one analyses the institutional distance (ID) between the home and 
the host countries influencing EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries. 
Based on the comprehensive eight dimensions of ID framework developed 
by Berry et al. (2010), this study develops various hypotheses of positive 
and negative relationships between institutional distance and EMNEs’ 
CBMAs in the OECD countries. Empirical results confirm the impact of 
political, economic, knowledge, global-connectedness, administrative and 
cultural distance. Financial, demographic and geographic distances are 
insignificant.  
 
The second study examines the role of political institutions in the host and 
home countries of EMNEs’ CBMAs, the two groups of variables that are 
often treated separately in the existing literature. Hypotheses are developed 
based on the concepts of six political institutions by Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
Empirical results show that in general host country political institutions 
positively affect EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries while home 
country political institutions play a negative role. Not all political 
institutional factors are of equal importance. Firms are concerned about 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption of 
host countries, and political stability and lack of violence, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and corruption of home countries.  
 
The third project looks into the acquired firm performance. Using 
accounting measures for firm performance, this empirical study analyses the 
impact of ID on acquired firm performance. Results suggest that formal 
institutional distance (political, economic and administrative) positively 
affect acquired firm performance, while informal institutional distance 
(cultural and knowledge) negatively affect acquired firm performance. 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Background and Research Questions 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) have long been used as an 
important strategy for firms’ international strategic expansion. CBMAs can 
be used to access new markets, acquire resources and strategic assets and 
improve firm’s efficiency. Thanks to the fast technological development and 
the increasing globalization after World War II, multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) from developed economies (DEs) – North America, Europe and 
Japan – have dominated the field of CBMAs (Guillén and García-Canal, 
2009). However since the early 1980s, MNEs from emerging economies 
(EMNEs) have become important players in the world CBMA landscape 
(Malhotra et al., 2009). A few high-profile cases have attracted lots of media 
attention as well as academic studies, for example, Lenovo (China)’s 
acquisition of the personal computer division of IBM (US), Dubai Ports 
World’s successful bid for the P&O Steam Navigation Company (UK), Tata 
(India)’s takeover of Corus (UK/Netherlands), Cemex (Mexico)’s purchase 
of Rinker (Australia) and Lukoil (Russian Federation)’s acquisition of 
Nelson Resources (UK). 
 
In aggregate statistical terms, the rise of CBMAs by EMNEs has been 
 phenomenal. Back in 1991, EMNEs only made 101 out of 1,582 CBMA 
deals in the world, with the total volume of deals being 2.25 billion US 
dollars, which only accounted for 10.69% of the total volume of the world 
CBMAs. EMNEs have become frequent purchasers since the start of the 
new century. In 2007, EMNEs made 1,047 cases of CBMAs in the world, 
which almost tripled the number in 2001 (371). There were more than $144 
billion in CBMA transactions by EMNEs, which accounted for almost 14.16% 
of the world total volume in 2007. Although recession since 2008 has 
affected the world in general, EMNEs have maintained the growth in 
internationalisation. In 2008, both the number and volume of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs increased by 1% compared to 2007. In 2009 and 2010, almost 30% 
of the world CBMAs was contributed by EMNEs (UNCTAD, 2011, 
UNCTAD, 2008, UNCTAD, 2007, UNCTAD, 2001, UNCTAD, 2000, 
UNCTAD, 2010, UNCTAD, 2009). Looking more closely into the statistics 
of EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs, the number accounted for 4.6% of the total 
number of EMNEs’ CBMA deals in 1991; however, it sharply increased to 
30% in 1999, and has maintained at the level of at least 34% since 2000 
(Author’s own calculations based on the dataset from SDC database and 
UNCTAD World Development Report 2000-2011).  
 
In contrast with MNEs form DEs (DMNEs), EMNEs exhibit different 
characteristics in CBMAs. First, EMNEs are weaker in the level of 
 technology and know-how assets than DMNEs. DMNEs often seek 
resources and new markets through CBMAs, while EMNEs are often 
motivated to improve and strengthen their competitive advantages by 
acquiring advanced R&D, human resources, brand reputation and other 
strategic assets from CBMAs in DEs (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008, 
Kedia et al., 2012). Second, EMNEs are less experienced in international 
business than DMNEs. Prior experience help expose firms to a variety of 
ideas and events, which can lead to a more extensive knowledge base and 
potentially increase technological capabilities (Shimizu et al., 2004). Third, 
EMNEs may acquire value added assets overseas in order to break the 
institutional constraints at home, because a weak home institution provides 
EMNEs with a constrained, unstable, costly and unpredictable market 
(Goldstein and Pusterla, 2010). Fourth, government is likely to be more 
influential in EMNEs’ activities. EMNEs sometimes have a government 
background, or compete with government support (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
 
There is extensive literature on CBMAs from DEs to DEs or to EEs (e.g. 
Anand and Kogut, 1997, Erel et al., 2012, Shimizu et al., 2004). Studies of 
EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs have received little attention until recently 
(Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). Existing empirical studies mostly 
focus on EMNEs’ expansion into developing countries (Jormanainen and 
Koveshnikov, 2012). However, upmarket acquisitions from EEs to DEs are 
 of particular strategic significance to EMNEs. They represent a quite 
effective and quick way for EMNEs to access strategic assets that are mostly 
or only available in DEs (Luo and Tung, 2007, Shimizu et al., 2004). To fill 
the research gap, this thesis adopts the institution-based view (IBV) as a 
theoretical lens for understanding the determinants and the performance 
consequence of EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs.  
 
The basic thrust of the IBV is that firm strategy and performance are 
constrained by conditions set by institutions; more colloquially, by the 
“rules of the game” (North, 1990). In a country characterized by strong 
institutions with well-developed factor markets, few government 
interventions and an effective mechanism for contract enforcement, the 
costs of doing business there are likely to be low, which facilitates economic 
activities. To the contrary, in a country characterized by weak institutions, 
firms face constraints resulting from insufficiently developed 
market-supporting institutions and additional hazards, restrictions and costs. 
MNEs embed in both their home and host country contexts; they are, 
therefore, affected by both home and host country institutions. However, the 
home and host countries of EMNEs in DEs have different institutions. The 
host DEs are often considered as having “invisible, efficient and supporting 
institutions”, while the home EEs are more likely to have constrained 
institutions and lack market-support mechanisms (Peng, 2002).  
 Existing studies, though recognizing the role of institutions in EMNEs’ 
CBMAs, are limited in their treatment of institutional factors (Zhang et al., 
2011, Stucchi, 2012, Lin et al., 2009). Institution is often considered a black 
box. To the best of my knowledge, only a few studies explicitly examine the 
multi-dimensional nature of institutions. Berry et al. (2010) provide the 
most comprehensive framework with eight dimensions for institutional 
distance: political, economic, cultural, financial, knowledge, 
global-connectedness, demographic and administrative distance. With 
regard to political institutions, Kaufmann constructs six indicators: voice 
and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 1999, Kaufmann et al., 2009, Kaufmann et al., 2007). In 
this thesis, I look in detail at the role of different institutional dimensions in 
EMNEs’ CBMA decisions in the OECD countries and the performance 
consequence of the acquired firms. Thus I aim to offer a more 
comprehensive understanding of the role of institutions in EMNEs’ CBMAs. 
 
The first study investigates how institutional distance (ID) between home 
and host countries affects EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries. This 
study links the ID research by Berry et al. (2010) to EMNEs’ CBMA 
decisions in the OECD countries, and tests hypotheses on how different 
dimensions of ID influence CBMAs by EMNEs in the OECD countries 
 using a multi-home and multi-host country dataset.  
 
Following from the first study, the second research project takes an in-depth 
look into political institutions. This study links the research of Kaufmann 
and his associates in 1999, 2007 and 2009 to EMNEs’ CBMA decisions in 
the OECD countries. Hypotheses are formulated on how different 
dimensions of political institutions of EMNEs’ home and host countries 
affect their strategic decisions.  
 
EMNEs acquire strategic assets, such as advanced marketing skills, superior 
R&D ability, managerial know-how assets and human assets through 
CBMAs in DE markets (Buckley et al., 2007, Kedia et al., 2012, Luo and 
Tung, 2007, Shimizu et al., 2004, Lu et al., 2011). In the meantime, target 
firms in DEs benefit from the strong financial support and the new, large 
market provided by these EMNEs. CBMAs are therefore considered by 
managers of both the acquired and the target firms as a way to improve firm 
performance (Shimizu et al., 2004). The third study examines the role of ID 
in affecting firm performance in CBMAs.  
 
 
 
 
 1.2 Potential Contributions 
 
This thesis intends to enrich the research agenda of EMNEs’ CBMAs in 
OECD countries. The first study on the determinants of location choice tries 
to provide a comprehensive conceptual framework on home-host country 
institutional distance (ID) and EMNEs’ CBMAs in OECD countries. 
Existing literature has paid attention to institutional influences on CBMAs, 
but most of them study the single dimension of institutional distance (Di 
Giovanni, 2005, Malhotra et al., 2009, Xu and Shenkar, 2002, Zhang et al., 
2011). It is often argued that ID creates barriers to interactions between 
headquarters and host country subsidiaries and between these subsidiaries 
and local economic agents. This, therefore, has a negative impact on 
CBMAs. However, this view fails to take into account the 
multi-dimensional nature of ID. Different dimensions of ID impact CBMAs 
in different ways. This study tries to develop hypotheses with regard to eight 
dimensions of institutional distance in addition to geographic distance. This 
study intends to examine the relationships between these distances and the 
number of CBMAs by EMNEs in the OECD countries.  
  
The second research study considers home and host country political 
institutions in an integrated framework. Existing research often treats these 
two groups of variables separately. With the exception of Globerman and 
 Shapiro (2002), existing studies also only examine limited aspects of the 
institution. This research recognizes that EMNEs may consider both groups 
of variables at absolute terms simultaneously. I develop hypotheses based on 
the concepts developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999): voice and accountability, 
political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. This study intends to examine 
the relationships between home political institutions and the number of 
CBMAs by EMNEs in the OECD countries as well as the relationships 
between host political institutions and the number of CBMAs by EMNEs in 
the OECD countries. 
 
The third project on firm performance again tries to capture properly the 
determining role of institutional distance. EMNEs use CBMAs to acquire 
advanced strategic assets in DEs, but the acquired firms in DEs can also 
benefit from CBMAs through entering the new, large market and obtaining 
financial support through EMNEs (Buckley et al., 2007, Kedia et al., 2012, 
Luo and Tung, 2007, Shimizu et al., 2004, Lu et al., 2011). Differently from 
the existing literature, this study looks into the different aspects of 
institutions, formal and informal institutional distance. It intends to examine 
the impact of formal institutional distance on the performance of acquired 
firms of EMNEs in DEs, as well as the impact of informal institutional 
distance on the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in in the OECD 
 countries. 
 
Empirically, I make a contribution by testing hypotheses on three datasets 
covering multiple-host and multiple-home countries in recent years when 
EMNEs have had substantial activities in DEs. The wide geographic 
coverage of the sample across a relatively long time period provides 
potentially good variance to test for varying impacts of the different 
dimensions of institutions under study. The findings help provide new 
insights into EMNEs that undertake CBMAs in different institutional 
contexts, and broaden the understanding of complicity associated with 
institutions in the strategic location decisions of EMNEs and the 
performance consequence.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis comprises six chapters. The structure of the thesis and the 
summary of each chapter are presented below. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
The first chapter introduces the research theme of the thesis and key 
research questions, and then previews the potential contributions to the 
research topic.  
 Chapter 2 – An Overview of EMNEs and the Institution-based View  
Chapter two presents background information for the analysis of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs in DEs. It covers the discussion of key concepts of EEs, DEs, 
EMNEs. It provides an overview of the IBV and the conceptualization of 
institutional distance.  
 
Chapter 3 – How Institutional Distance Matters in the EMNEs’ CBMAs in 
the OECD Countries 
Chapter three provides a systematic examination of the role of institutional 
distance in the location choice of EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries, 
based on the IBV. It focuses on treating institutional distance as a 
multi-dimensional concept. More specifically, institutional distance covers 
political, economic, financial, administrative, demographic cultural, 
knowledge and global-connectedness distance.  
 
Chapter 4 – The Role of Political Institutions in EMNEs’ CBMAs in the 
OECD Countries 
Chapter four provides an empirical analysis of the role of political 
institutions of both home and host countries in the location choice of 
EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries. Instead of taking either the 
perspective of the home country or that of the host country, this research 
 considers a number of different aspects of both the home and the host 
countries.  
 
Chapter 5 – The Impact of Institutional Distance on the Performance of 
Acquired Firms by EMNEs in the OECD Countries 
After assessing the determinants of EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD 
countries, Chapter 5 assesses the impact of institutional distance on acquired 
firm performance. Different from the conventional wisdom that institutional 
distance negatively affects firm performance, this chapter argues that formal 
institutional distance positively affects firm performance, but informal 
institutional distance negatively affects firm performance.  
 
Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
Chapter six summarizes the key findings of the thesis. This chapter also 
presents the contributions and implications and discusses the limitations of 
the research, and suggests potential research topics to extend the future 
research in this field. 
  
 Chapter 2 An Overview of EMNEs and the 
Institution-based View  
 
This chapter presents background information for the analysis of 
multinational enterprises from emerging economies (EMNE)s’ cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) in developed economies (DEs). It covers 
the discussion of key concepts of emerging economies (EEs), DEs and 
EMNEs. It provides an overview of the institution-based view (IBV) and the 
conceptualization of institutional distance. Below, section 2.1 describes the 
identification and characteristics of EEs and EMNEs. Section 2.2 presents a 
summary of EMNEs’ CBMAs. Section 2.3 covers IBV. Section 2.4 focuses 
on the institutional distance. 
 
2.1 EEs and EMNEs 
 
2.1.1 Emerging Economies 
 
There is no agreed definition on the term “emerging economies”. However, 
there are different lists for emerging economies produced by the IMF, the 
Emerging Market Global Players project at Columbia University, the FTSE 
Group, MSCI Barra, Standard and Poor’s, Dow Jones, BBVA Research, 
MasterCard and the Economist. Putting together these lists, more than 50 
 fast-developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle 
East have been classified as “emerging economies”. Some unique 
characteristics can be observed for this group. First, EE governments always 
have a significant influence on EE business activities. The government 
influence can be either positive support or weak institutional constraints to 
motivate local firms to go international. Supportive home government 
policy prompts the domestic firm to internationalise for a better innovation 
environment or new market (Buckley et al., 2007). Efficient government can 
reduce time and transaction costs in dealing with international business (Liu 
and Buck, 2009). A stable political system also provides more confidence 
for domestic firms to internationalise (Hyun and Kim, 2010). However, 
compared with DE institutions, EEs have weak institutions, for example 
strong local protection and corruption. In order to break these domestic 
constraints, domestic firms go abroad to seek other more open institutions 
(Luo and Tung, 2007, Rossi and Volpin, 2004).  
 
Second, the infrastructure in EEs is weak; innovation systems and 
technology are undeveloped. In EEs, firms struggle with weak legal and 
regulatory institutions. Many EEs suffer from unbalanced infrastructure 
development, for example an underdeveloped transportation system and 
lower education coverage. Domestic firms are forced to expand overseas for 
better infrastructures and advanced strategic assets (Bekaert and Harvey, 
 2002). The lack of local infrastructure and technology brings constraints on 
an efficient legal system and new technology to provide new and proper 
products and services. 
 
Finally, the markets in EEs are demanding and fragmented. On one hand, in 
association with a previous point, EE markets are fast growing and changing 
rapidly. Both the development need and the shortage of resources at home 
require domestic firms to seek natural and non-natural resources from 
foreign sources, either at home or by going abroad. On the other hand, there 
are increasingly more interactions between DEs and EEs. Because a 
fast-growing economy encourages more demand for DEs’ products and 
services by the EEs’ population, more international business occurs to fulfil 
the population needs (Goldstein and Pusterla, 2010, Li and Hoyer-Ellefsen, 
2008).  
 
2.1.2 Emerging Economies Multinationals 
 
EMNEs are companies who originate from EEs and are involved in outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in one or more foreign economies, where 
they spread effective control and embark on value-adding activities (Luo 
and Tung, 2007, Child and Rodrigues, 2005). In association with the strong 
economic growth, EMNEs are more active than ever before. EMNEs have 
 some unique features. First, most EMNEs are successful enterprises in the 
domestic market but are less competitive in international business (Child 
and Rodrigues, 2005). Second, a large number of EMNEs are backed by 
governments or are state-owned enterprises. They engage foreign 
acquisition with home institutional support such as rich industrial 
experience, government underwriting and government funding. For some 
private and public-sharing enterprises, they also obtain institutional support 
such as a reduction in value added tax and government funding (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Third, EMNEs acquire developed multinational enterprises 
(DMNEs) to access advanced technology, HR resources and other strategic 
assets, in order to offset their competitive weaknesses. Fourth, target firms 
are highly related to EMNEs’ own industrial sectors. For example, Indian 
and Chinese automobile and manufacturing multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) all acquired targets in the same industry, such as India TATA-UK 
Land Rover and China CNOOC (Oil)-Canada NEXEN (Oil). As a 
consequence, EMNEs not only enhance their leading positions at home, but 
also become more competitive in the foreign market (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Finally, EMNEs are different from DMNEs in corporate and social cultures, 
languages and other social norms. Successfully dealing with cultural 
differences would be fatal to the success of CBMAs in DEs. EMNEs need to 
consider the cultural gap as one of the key factors, and EMNEs gradually 
learn from previous experience or similar examples to reduce the risk of 
 cultural failure (Goldstein and Pusterla, 2010, Shimizu et al., 2004). 
 
2.2 EMNEs’ CBMAs 
 
In recent decades, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) have 
experienced a phenomenal growth, from only 6.36% in total volume of 
worldwide CBMAs in 2000, to 28.53% in 2010. Emerging economies (EE) 
firms have contributed a remarkable raise since 2000 (UNCTAD, 2000, 
UNCTAD, 2007, UNCTAD, 2011). Back in 1991, EMNEs only made 101 
deals out of 1,582 total worldwide CBMA deals; the volume was as little as 
$2.25 billion, which only accounted for 10.69% of the total volume of 
worldwide CBMAs. Since the start of the new century, EMNEs have 
become active purchasers in the international market. In 2007, EEs tripled 
the number of CBMAs deals to 1,047 compared with the figure in 2001. 
More than $144 billion was traded, which accounts for 14.16% of the world 
total volume. The recession since 2008 has negatively affected the absolute 
number and the volume of EMNEs’ CBMA cases. However, the share of 
EMNEs in the overall world CBMAs has kept the upward trajectory. In 
2008, both the share and the volume of EMNEs’ CBMAs increased by 1% 
compared to 2007. In 2009 and 2010, as much as 30% of worldwide 
CBMAs were contributed by EE firms. 
 
 Taking a closer look into the statistics of EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs to the 
total number of EMNEs’ CBMAs, it accounted from the lowest 4.6% in 
1991 to the highest 30% in 1999 over a period of 1991-1999. The figure 
rapidly rose up to 39.17% in 2000. More than half (56%) of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs deals were made in DEs in 2008. Then it keeps the figure of more 
than 37% until now (Author’s own calculations based on the dataset from 
SDC database and UNCTAD World Development Report 2000-2011). Table 
1 shows the absolute volume and number of EMNEs’ CBMAs from 
2000-2010. Table 2 shows the growth trend of the number of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs from 2000-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1 Shares of EMNEs’ CBMA Activities, 2000-2010  
 
Source: World Investment Report (various issues) and author’s own 
calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total FDI 
Inflows 
Number of CBMAs  Volume of CBMAs 
Year 
World 
(US$ m) 
World  
Emerging  
Economies 
Share 
(%) 
World 
(US$ m)  
Emerging  
Economies 
Share 
(%)  
1991 154,072.7 1,582 101 6.38 21,094 2,254 10.69 
1992 165,880.8 2,132 144 6.75 48,106 7,453 15.49 
1993 223,316.3 2,179 222 10.19 43,623 6,397 14.66 
1994 255,999.9 2,774 293 10.56 91,769 9,946 10.84 
1995 342,798.6 3,404 286 8.40 112,527 6,350 5.64 
1996 390,899.5 3,650 412 10.01 142,557 14,371 10.08 
1997 487,853.5 4,132 414 5.61 180,751 13,564 7.50 
1998 706,265.9 4,942 325 6.58 406,427 12,691 3.12 
1999 1,091,438.7 5,549 311 5.60 630,807 11,569 1.83 
2000 1,400,540.6 6,280 531 8.46 905,214 57,599 6.36 
2001 827,617.3 4,368 371 8.49 429,374 28,019 6.53 
2002 627,974.8 3,114 426 13.68 248,446 29,711 11.96 
2003 586,956.4 3,004 418 13.91 182,874 16,059 8.78 
2004 744,329.2 3,683 523 14.20 227,221 25,934 11.41 
2005 980,727.1 5,004 765 15.29 462,253 68,680 14.86 
2006 1,463,351 5,747 839 14.60 625,320 114,922 18.38 
2007 1,975,537 7,018 1047 14.92 1,022,725 144,830 14.16 
2008 1,790,706 6,425 1011 15.74 706,543 105,849 14.98 
2009 1,197,824 4,239 746 17.60 249,732 73,975 29.62 
2010 1,309,001 5,484 1084 19.77 344,029 98,149 28.53 
 Table 2 Growth Trend of EMNEs’ CBMAs, 2000-2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on UNCTAD World Development 
Report 2000-2011 
 
2.3 Institution-based View  
 
The theoretical roots of the institution-based view can be traced back to both 
economics (North, 1990) and sociology (Scott, 1995). The 1993 Nobel Prize 
Winner for Economics, Douglass North, gives institution the following 
definition: 
 
“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, 
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 constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, and 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. 
Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically 
economies.” (North, 1990) 
 
North (1990) indicates that the effectiveness of formal and informal 
constraints can come from different directions, such as government support 
and constraints, education levels and religions. Institutions reduce the 
uncertainty of firm and organization behaviours. Formal constraints such as 
law and policies can regulate the instability arising from informal social and 
common behaviours. Informal constraints can provide constancy to 
institutions when formal constraints fail. 
 
Throughout the social sciences including economics, sociology, philosophy, 
politics, anthropology, psychology and geography, the term institution has 
been used widely. In sociology, Scott (1995) develops “three pillars” to 
measure the institution: regulative, normative and cognitive pillars. The 
regulative pillar stands for instrumental rules and laws to ensure the stability 
of the society, such as economic factors. The normative pillar refers to the 
social obligation to locate people’s roles and expectations to govern social 
behaviour. The cognitive pillar can be translated as social culture and ethnic 
nationality. Table 3 below gives details of the three pillars. 
 Table 3 Institutional Pillars 
 
 Pillars of Institutions 
Theory 
element 
Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Basis of 
compliance 
Expedience  Social Obligation Taken for granted 
Mechanisms Coercive  Normative  Mimetic 
Logic  Instrumentality  Appropriateness  Orthodoxy 
Indicators  
Rules, laws, 
sanctions  
Certification, 
accreditation  
Prevalence, 
isomorphism 
Basis of 
legitimacy  
Legally sanctioned  Morally governed  
Culturally supported, 
conceptually correct 
Source: Scott (1995) 
 
With the traditional and broadly-speaking view of institutional economics 
by North (1990), the sociology version of institution theory has close 
interaction with the economic version of institution theory (Peng et al., 2009, 
Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012, Kostova et al., 2008, Peng, 2002). 
The two pillars in Scott’s definition – the cognitive and normative pillars – 
are conceptually close to each other and to culture, or the informal 
institutions in North’s definition, while the regulatory pillar resembles 
formal institutions (Scott, 1995). Table 4 explains the interaction of 
institution theory with economics (North, 1990) and sociology (Scott, 
1995). 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 Dimensions of Institutions 
 
Degree of Formality 
(North, 1990)  
Examples Supportive Pillars 
(Scott, 1995) 
 Formal institutions  Laws 
 Regulations 
 Rules 
 Regulative 
 Informal 
institutions 
 Norms   Normative 
 Cultures  
 Ethics 
 Cognitive 
Source: Peng et al. (2009) 
 
Though having different theoretical foci, they are broadly complementary. 
All different disciplinary theories propose one core issue: institution matters. 
In international business and management, Previous scholars suggest that 
the economic versions of institutional theory have gained influence 
(Kostova et al., 2008, Peng, 2002, Peng et al., 2008).. The growth of the 
firm roots in planned economies in transition: institutions, organizations, 
and strategic choice. Hence this study attempts to draw insights from 
institutional economic version of institution theory by North (1990), to 
understand EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.4 Institution Distance 
 
Researchers focused on the host institution until the mid-1990s; since then 
more attention has been paid to differences between institutions and the role 
of institutional differences on international business (Peng et al., 2009). 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) point out that institutional distance between host 
and home countries should draw more attention than an individual 
institution study, a call followed up increasingly by more studies (Berry et 
al., 2010, Busenitz et al., 2000, Ghemawat, 2001, Xu and Shenkar, 2002). 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) also propose that the institution distance 
between host and home countries brings less FDI due to difficulties in 
organization practices and implementation. MNEs struggle with the pressure 
of operating in different institutional environments. These pressures may 
have significant influences on competitive strategy and human resource 
management (HRM) practices. MNEs often find it difficult to establish an 
efficient organization in host countries due to large institution differences 
(Busenitz et al., 2000).  
 
Ghemawat (2001) develops a “CAGE” model based on institution theory by 
North (1990), and provides an extensive framework to categorise institution 
distances into four panels: cultural, administrative, geographic and 
economic distances. Cultural distance contains the social and human norms, 
 language and education differences between countries; geographic distance 
simply is the actual gravity distance between countries’ major cities in miles 
or kilometres; administrative distance implies the political and bureaucratic 
environment differences between host and home countries; economic 
distance includes national economic differences such as GDP or the 
exchange rate. Elements in each distance are discussed in two columns in 
Table 5: the Country Pairs (Bilateral) category refers to comparable 
differences between host and home countries. The Country (Unilateral) 
category contains an individual country’s specific feature, weakness or 
advantages. The four dimensions framework provides a systematic tool for 
institutional distances research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 Bilateral and Multilateral Factors in the CAGE Framework 
 
 Countries 
(Unilateral/Multilateral) 
Country Pairs (Bilateral) 
Cultural 
Distance 
 Traditionalism 
 Insularity 
 Different languages 
 Different ethnicities; lack 
of connective ethnic or 
social networks 
 Different religions 
 Different values, norms, 
and dispositions 
 Lack of trust 
Administrative 
Distance 
 Nonmarket/closed 
economy (home bias 
vs. foreign bias) 
 Weak institutions, 
corruption 
 Lack of membership 
in international 
organizations 
 Lack of colonial ties 
 Lack of shared regional 
trading bloc 
 Lack of common currency 
 Political hostility 
Geographic 
Distance 
 Landlockedness 
 Lack of internal 
navigability 
 Geographic size 
 Weak transportation 
or communication 
links 
 Geographic 
remoteness 
 Physical distance 
 Lack of land border 
 Differences in 
climates/disease 
environments 
 Differences in time zones 
Economic 
Distance 
 Low per capita income 
 Economic size 
 Rich/poor differences 
 Other differences in cost or 
quality of natural 
resources, financial 
resources, human 
resources, infrastructure, 
information or knowledge 
Source: Ghemawat (2001) 
 
The CAGE model attempts to solve some remaining shortcomings. First, 
coverage of institutional characters becomes wider. For example, by adding 
 geographic distance into the CAGE framework, the distance effect of 
geographic-distant can be scaled into EEs to DEs research; second, insight 
into institutional characters becomes more precise. Some institutional 
distance can be time–varying. Previous formal and informal constraints may 
remain almost invariant, but others, such as economic factors, can change 
constantly, especially for EEs; rapid growing economic factors are one of 
their symptoms. CAGE takes the time-varying factors into consideration.  
 
Although Ghemawat’s framework complements some existing shortages, it 
is still inadequate to take other factors into consideration, which may affect 
CBMAs as well, such as the national innovation system and global 
connectedness. Recently, Berry et al. (2010) proposed an eight-dimension 
framework, which is considered the most comprehensive framework by far. 
Berry et al. (2010) not only summarize most of the previous institutional 
distance research, to develop and subdivide it into eight dimensions, but also 
include relatively comprehensive component factors within each distance 
dimension index. In addition, they also create some new distances, such as 
demographic distance, knowledge distance and global-connectedness 
distance. Financial distance is explicitly distinguished from economic 
distance, and political distance is clearly classified with administrative 
distance. With a further analysis of US outward foreign subsidiaries, they 
find either negative or positive cross-national distances influences on 
 managerial decisions. The empirical evidence of institutional distances 
influences proves the eight-dimension framework to be a more multiple 
dimensional approach. This research also adopts this framework to discuss 
institutional influences on EMNEs’ CBMAs. The dimensions including 
geographic distance are explained in Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 Dimensions of Institutional Distance and Component Variables 
 
Distance  Definitions Component variables  
Political distance 
(PD) 
Differences in 
political stability, 
democracy and 
trade bloc 
membership 
Democracy score 
Regional trade agreement 
Membership in WTO 
Democracy score  
Economic distance 
(ED) 
Differences in 
economic 
development and 
macroeconomic 
characteristics 
GDP per capita 
Exchange rate 
Export (%GDP) 
Import (%GDP)  
Financial distance 
(FD) 
Differences in 
financial sector 
development 
Private sector (%GDP)  
Stock market size/value (%GDP) 
Number of listed companies  
Knowledge distance 
(KD) 
Differences in 
patents and 
scientific production 
Number of patents per 1 million 
population 
Number of scientific articles per 
1 million population  
Global-connectedness 
distance (GCD) 
Differences in 
tourism and internet 
use 
International tourism expenditure 
(%GDP) 
International tourism receipts 
(%GDP) 
Internet users per 1000 people  
Demographic 
distance (DD) 
Differences in 
demographic 
characteristics 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 
Birth rate 
Population under 14 (%) 
Population above 65 (%)  
Administrative 
distance (AD) 
Differences in 
colonial ties, 
language, religion 
and legal system 
Colonizer-colonized link 
Common language 
(%Population) 
Common religion (%Population) 
Legal system  
Cultural distance 
(CD) 
Differences in 
attitudes towards 
authority, trust and 
individuality, and 
importance of work 
and family 
Hofstede’s 4 cultural dimensions: 
Power distance 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Individualism 
Masculinity 
Geographic distance 
(GD) 
Great circle distance 
between geographic 
centre of countries 
Great circle distance 
Source: Berry et al. (2010) 
 Chapter 3 How Institutional Distance Matters in the 
EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD Countries?  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) have long been used by 
firms as a prevalent strategy for international strategic expansion. 
Technological development and the increasing globalization of business 
have heightened the opportunities and challenges to CBMAs. For many 
years following World War II, multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the 
developed economies (DEs) fuelled the growth in CBMAs. The landscape 
was dominated by North American and European MNEs, then Japanese 
MNEs joined the club (Guillén and García-Canal, 2009). Up until the early 
1980s, FDI flows originating in emerging economies (EEs) were negligible 
(Malhotra et al., 2009). Since 1990s, MNEs from emerging economies 
(EMNEs) have increasingly proliferated in the global landscape (Table 1).  
 
EMNEs are different from MNEs from DEs (DMNEs) in a number of ways, 
including size, technology and knowledge, liabilities in international 
markets, motives, and government interference in business activities 
(Guillén and García-Canal, 2009, Goldstein and Pusterla, 2010, Luo and 
Tung, 2007, Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). EMNEs tend to be smaller in 
 size and have less cutting-edge technologies and less advanced knowledge. 
EMNEs, similar to DMNEs, suffer from liability of foreignness, but they 
also have to overcome the hurdle of liability of country of origin, a potential 
disadvantage linked to perceived weakness and lack of global dominance of 
the home country economy (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). DMNEs use 
CBMAs to access resources and new markets and to improve efficiency, 
sometimes to seek strategic assets, but EMNEs’ motives are more likely to 
be strategic-assets seeking (Luo and Tung, 2007, Kedia et al., 2012). EE 
governments are more likely to influence EMNEs while DE governments 
are more likely to leave DMNEs to market mechanisms. 
 
Despite the rich literature in CBMAs across the boundaries of accountancy, 
finance, economics and management (e.g. Anand and Kogut, 1997, Erel et 
al., 2012, Shimizu et al., 2004), CBMAs by EMNEs have received little 
attention until recently (Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). Given the 
overall magnitude and the rapid growth of CBMAs by EMNEs and the 
different characteristics of EMNEs and DMNEs, it is crucial to understand 
what drives EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs. However, existing empirical studies 
tend to focus on EMNEs’ expansion into developing countries (Jormanainen 
and Koveshnikov, 2012). To fill this research gap, the study takes the 
institutional approach and investigates how institutional distance between 
home and host countries (henceforth ID) affects EMNEs’ CBMAs in the 
 OECD countries, the so called “upmarket acquisitions” (Stucchi, 2012). 
Upmarket acquisitions are important for EMNEs as they allow them quick 
access to resources and capabilities available in DEs, reduce gaps with their 
competitors and build credibility to attract employees and suppliers (Stucchi, 
2012, Luo and Tung, 2007, De Beule et al., 2014). ID is particularly 
important for MNEs operating in different institutional contexts (Meyer et 
al., 2009).  
 
While firms and capital, even labour, are increasingly mobile, institutions 
tend to be internationally immobile (Mudambi and Navarra, 2002). There 
are substantial differences in institutional contexts in EEs and DEs 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). DEs are often trusted to have “invisible, efficient 
and supporting institutions” (Peng, 2002). In contrast, institutions in EEs 
tend to be considered weak and lack of market-support. EMNEs, when 
undertaking CBMAs in the OECD countries (a group of DEs), must 
accommodate institutions that vary between countries as differences in 
institutions offer opportunities and challenges to them from fully realizing 
their strategic objectives. Several studies have attempted to explain CBMAs 
from the institutional perspective (Zhang et al., 2011, Stucchi, 2012, Lin et 
al., 2009), but most are limited in failing to take into account the 
multi-dimensional nature of the construct or in the geographic scope by only 
studying one home country or one host country. I offer the conceptual 
 framework to explain how the individual dimension of ID influences 
CBMAs by EMNEs in the OECD countries and test hypotheses using a 
multi-home and multi-host country dataset.  
 
Though the term institutional distance has been extensively used in the 
literature (Berry et al., 2010, Eden and Miller, 2004, Xu and Shenkar, 2002, 
Kostova, 1997), most scholars do not pay attention to what is inside this 
black box. There are limited efforts on identifying the dimensions of ID. To 
the best of my knowledge, only two studies, Ghemawat (2001) and Berry et 
al. (2010), attempt to provide a comprehensive conceptualization of distance. 
The former proposes three dimensions of non-geographic distance: cultural, 
political and economic distance, while the latter is more wide-ranging to 
include another five dimensions, i.e. financial, knowledge, 
global-connectedness, demographic and administrative distance. In this 
study, I link the ID research by Berry et al. (2010) to EMNEs’ CBMA 
decisions in the OECD countries. By studying eight ID factors in addition to 
geographic distance, I offer a more comprehensive understanding of the role 
of ID in one strategic decision engaged in by EMNEs: the CBMA market 
location decision.  
 
This study contributes to the existing CBMA literature in several ways. 
Theoretically, I develop a conceptual framework that draws on the 
 institution-based view for investigating the impact of eight dimensions of ID 
between the home and host countries on CBMAs by EMNEs. In so doing, 
this study moves away from a simplistic way of treating ID as a black box, 
which is often the feature of existing studies, to a clear recognition of the 
multi-dimensional nature of the concept. Different dimensions of ID impact 
CBMAs in different ways. I develop hypotheses of positive relationships 
between political, economic and knowledge distance, but negative 
relationships between financial, global-connectedness, demographic, 
administrative and cultural distance and the number of CBMAs by EMNEs 
in DEs.  
 
Empirically, this study tests hypotheses on a dataset covering multiple-host 
and multiple-home countries in recent years when EMNEs have substantial 
activities in DEs (EMNEs from 43 EEs in 26 DEs during 2001-2011). The 
wide geographic coverage of the sample across a relatively long time period 
provides potentially good variance to test for varying impacts of the 
different dimensions of ID under study. The high levels of variance also 
make it unlikely that the results are driven by the idiosyncrasies of a specific 
home or host country. The findings help provide new insights into how 
EMNEs undertake CBMAs in different institutional contexts and broaden 
the understanding of complicity associated with ID in strategic location 
decisions of EMNEs. These findings also help explain the apparent 
 contradictions in existing studies which often employ a single measure of 
ID.  
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of existing literature on institutional distance and location choice 
of EMNEs’ CBMAs. Following on from the review, I propose hypotheses 
on the impact of institutional distance on the CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs. 
Section 3.3 describes data, variables and methodology. Section 3.4 discusses 
empirical results and findings, followed by the conclusion in section 3.5. 
Contribution and implications are also discussed in the final section. 
 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Institutions are defined as the rules of the game in a society that provide 
stability, reduce uncertainty and alleviate information complexity in 
economic exchanges (North, 1990). These rules are humanly devised 
constraints that structure the way in which organizations (e.g. political 
bodies, economic agents and social actors) interact with each other and 
adapt to changing environments by making strategic choices such as 
compliance, co-operation and defiance (Oliver, 1997). Institutions include 
both formal and informal components. Formal institutions are explicitly 
created, usually by legislation and are composed of written rules, 
 regulations, laws and contracts that give structure to society. Informal 
institutions are the internally enforced modes of conduct in a society that 
impose constraints through customs, norms and cultures. Formal and 
informal institutions are strongly intertwined. Formal institutions are usually 
embedded in the settings of informal institutions, while informal institutions 
can also be shaped by formal institutions. Formal institutions may 
sometimes change abruptly, but many aspects of informal institutions are 
slow moving. 
 
Institutions vary across countries because of their path-dependent nature 
(Makino et al., 2004). Despite the rapid pace of globalization, differences 
between institutions in different countries have not been attenuated (Meyer 
et al., 2011). DEs tend to have developed institutions characterized by 
well-developed factor markets, few government interventions, and effective 
mechanism for contract enforcement. The costs of doing business there are 
likely to be low, which facilitates economic activities. EEs tend to have less 
advanced or incomplete institutions and local firms face constraints 
resulting from insufficiently developed market-supporting institutions and 
additional hazards, restrictions and costs. 
 
Institutions are important when it comes to EMNEs’ location choice in the 
OECD countries. The stability and efficiency of institutions determine the 
 transaction and co-ordination costs of production and innovation, therefore, 
determine and guide business conduct (Meyer et al., 2011). The institution 
shapes the costs of doing business in a particular market, and consequently, 
an investor’s preference for the location for new investment opportunities. 
When undertaking CBMAs, MNEs tend to compare the relative position of 
their home to their host country institutions. A conventional argument is that 
when entering institutionally distant countries, firms are challenged to 
bridge the differences between the home and the host country markets as the 
institutional distance creates barriers to social networks in local business 
communities, access to intangible assets and know-how shared between 
headquarters and host country subsidiaries and between the host countries 
subsidiaries and local firms. This increases the liability of foreignness that 
firms face in foreign markets and the uncertainties of international 
transactions (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2011). That is, ID can raise the risk 
of capitalizing on the opportunities in a host country market. However, all 
ID factors may not result in the same disadvantages to MNEs. Therefore, the 
study challenges this established claim and argue that given the 
multi-dimensional nature of the ID concept, some distance dimensions may 
actually have a positive impact on CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs.  
 
There are limited efforts on identifying the dimensions of ID. To the best of 
my knowledge, only two studies, Ghemawat (2001) and Berry et al. (2010), 
 attempt to provide a comprehensive conceptualization of distance. Berry et 
al. (2010)’s framework encompasses all dimensions covered by Ghemawat 
(2001) and five more; that is, eight dimensions, i.e. political, economic, 
financial, knowledge, global-connectedness distance, demographic, 
administrative and cultural distance. Table 6 shows a summary of the 
definitions of these dimensions of institutional distance. These definitions 
are expanded below. 
 
3.2.1 Political Distance (PD) 
 
The formal institutional environment emphasizes the influence of political 
systems. Political factors have long been recognized as important when 
MNEs make CBMA location decisions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). They 
are of particular concern to EMNEs because of the prominence of political 
influences in their home countries. The specific regulatory policies enacted 
by home country governments may encourage firms to engage in overseas 
expansion if host country governments are straightforward, consistent and 
liberal as is the case in DEs. EE governments promote policies to help guide 
outward FDI in the hope that CBMAs can bring these firms improvements 
in international competition (Liu and Buck, 2009). For example, Chinese 
firms are expected to respond to their government’s development plan by 
building and/or acquiring strategic assets in order to compete successfully in 
 the global landscape. But the question is: what kinds of political regimes of 
host DEs will be more attractive to EMNEs? Since CBMAs are fraught with 
information asymmetry and the potential for opportunism, EMNEs will 
likely choose a political institution that will help reduce transaction costs 
and provide incentives that promote CBMAs. 
 
By definition, a firm is most familiar with its domestic political regime and 
is likely to find that it is easier to navigate in one that is similar to that of its 
home country. Similar rules make legitimacy building easier in a host 
country. Institutional theory suggests that firms gain a “common 
understanding of what is appropriate and fundamentally meaningful 
behaviour” as a result of isomorphic (coercive, normative and mimetic) 
pressures embedded in different institutional contexts (Zucker, 1983). 
MNEs must align their practices with the host country political institutions 
when seeking acceptance as legitimate entities (Davis et al., 2000, Kostova 
and Zaheer, 1999). Working under different political regimes is likely to 
give rise to high costs of establishing new relationships with political 
players and will inhibit potential transactions because of increased search, 
negotiation, and enforcement costs. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the 
more similar the political institutions between the home and host countries 
are, the higher will be the number of CBMAs. 
 
 On the other hand, following the institutional escapism view (Luo et al., 
2010, Boisot and Meyer, 2008, Goldstein and Pusterla, 2010, Tolentino, 
2010, Witt and Lewin, 2007), EMNEs go abroad in order to seek a better 
institutional environment for their business. EMNEs experience extensive 
government interference in business activities, high regulatory uncertainty 
and weak intellectual property rights protection at home, which brings high 
transaction costs and limits their development. To create advanced resources 
and capabilities, they need to tap into well-established institutions that 
ensure transparency and contract enforcement and warrant low information 
asymmetries in the host country. Secondly, effective political institutions can 
prompt CBMAs with less time and money consumed on dealing with local 
governments and rules; as a result, reduce transaction costs of doing 
business in the host country (Kaufmann et al., 2007). Stable and open-policy 
institutions attract more inward M&As in the OECD countries (Hyun and 
Kim, 2010). Thus, the better the political institutions of the host country 
relative to that of the home country, the more attractive it will be to EMNEs.  
 
In their study of M&As in 49 home and 49 host countries between 1990 and 
1999, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that there are positive correlations 
between CBMAs and PD proxied by differences in accounting standards (an 
index of the quality of accounting disclosure) and investor protections (a 
measure of the effective rights of minority shareholders). Malhotra et al. 
 (2009) employ CBMA data by EMNEs from 18 EEs during 1990-2006 and 
show that the PD measured by government effectiveness from Kaufmann et 
al. (2007) is positively associated with the number of CBMAs by EMNEs. 
Turning to individual country studies, through examining 1,324 Chinese 
CBMAs between 1982 and 2009, Zhang et al. (2011) discover that good 
institutional quality of host countries proxied by political risk measures 
benefits Chinese overseas acquisitions. Chinese MNEs are constrained by 
political institutions with low environmental munificence, continuous 
economic liberalization, and gradual institutional transition. The substantial 
roles played by governments and CBMAs in DEs represent a means to 
acquire strategic assets, as a result of China’s unique institutional 
environment (Deng, 2009, Luo and Tung, 2007). Thus, following from this 
theoretical discussion and empirical evidence, the proposition is made that:  
H1: The larger the political distance between home and host countries, 
the more CBMAs are undertaken by EMNEs in DEs. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Distance (ED) 
 
ED represents the economic difference between EEs and DEs and is often 
considered to reflect differences in economic development, consumer 
income, costs and quality of resources, inflation, and trade activities (Berry 
et al., 2010). Conventional theory suggests that MNEs undertake 
 exploitative FDI to transfer firm-specific assets (FSAs) of proprietary value 
across borders and use these as an advantage to seek markets and resources 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Hence, relative to the home country, a similar 
economic environment in the host country facilitates CBMAs (Malhotra et 
al., 2009). Firms typically develop their FSAs based on the resource 
endowments of the home country. Operating in countries with similar 
economic characteristics to their home market gives MNEs the opportunity 
to take advantage of similar resources available in the host country and 
transfer skills and knowledge from home at low costs. Mitra and Golder 
(2002) further argue that similar economic distances also reflect similar 
consumption patterns and similar environments under which MNEs are 
exposed to similar marketing strategies. Therefore CBMAs are negatively 
associated with ED. 
 
However, EMNEs’ upmarket acquisitions are often of explorative nature 
involving gaining new information, knowledge, and other strategic assets 
from DEs (Kedia et al., 2012). The technological level of a country is 
generally related to its economic development (Tsang and Yip, 2007). DEs 
offer advanced knowledge reservoirs, educated workforces, and 
infrastructure that promote and protect knowledge development (Kedia et al., 
2012). For EMNEs to become or remain globally competitive, they must 
gain access to knowledge and other strategic assets in economically-distant 
 countries. ED also provides a strong basis for differentiation. Merging with 
or acquiring a DE firm in an economically-distant country gives an EMNE 
the opportunity to reach out to sources of unique, diverse and non-redundant 
knowledge. As a result, the higher is the level of ED, the higher is the scope 
for learning and value creation; hence, the larger is the number of CBMAs 
by EMNEs. Of the few empirical studies on ED and CBMA, a positive 
relationship is found in Mitra and Golder (2002), Malhotra et al. (2009),  
and Rossi and Volpin (2004). Therefore, the study formulates the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: The larger the economic distance between home and host countries, 
the more CBMAs are undertaken by EMNEs in DEs. 
 
3.2.3 Financial Distance (FD) 
 
FD refers to the differences in financial sector development and is mainly 
related to the equity and credit markets in the home and the host countries 
(Berry et al., 2010). The financial system is important for financial 
intermediation, the efficient allocation of capital, information asymmetry 
reduction, and risk management (Mirkin et al., 2013). CBMAs are often 
financed in the home country. Financially deeper markets that are more 
liquid and better functioning provide firms the financial means necessary to 
undertake investment projects that they might otherwise have to forego and 
 reduce information acquisition costs, hence, facilitate CBMAs (Di Giovanni, 
2005). An established financial infrastructure also reduces the MNE’s 
exposure to exchange rate risks (Bevan et al., 2004). Conversely, 
underdeveloped financial markets hold back entrepreneurial development 
and may cause problems for firm competitiveness, hence hinder outward 
CBMAs. However, CBMAs also require attention to host country financial 
systems. A financial market of host country systems supports acquirers to 
restructure and reallocate the assets and resources of target firms (Capron 
and Guillén, 2009). Therefore, EMNEs must attend to the proximity 
between the financial systems of the home and the host countries. If their 
home country’s financial system is convergent to a well-developed one in a 
DE, a larger number of CBMA deals can be expected. In contrast, a large 
FD inhibits CBMAs as there could be a mismatch between EMNEs’ 
strategic needs and financial means. Thus, the following hypothesis can be 
made:  
H3: The smaller the financial distance between the home and the host 
countries, the more CBMAs will be undertaken by EMNEs in DEs. 
 
Despite the significance of financial factors in CBMAs, to the best of my 
knowledge, only a few studies give attention to this. From only the home 
country perspective, Hyun and Kim (2010) and Di Giovanni (2005) find that 
financial markets of home countries have a strong positive association with 
 CBMAs. Coeurdacier et al. (2009) investigate the development of financial 
markets of both home and host countries of MNEs and argue that deeper 
financial markets of both countries matter to CBMAs. However, there is no 
study investigating the role of FD, as far as I know.   
 
3.2.4 Knowledge Distance (KD) 
 
KD captures the differences between countries’ capacities in creating 
knowledge and innovation. Different countries have different levels of 
knowledge (Nelson, 1993) because knowledge development depends on 
location-specific factors, such as the national innovation system, the 
education system, and the infrastructure for knowledge dissemination. For 
example, Cantwell (1989) finds evidence of a path dependence in 
technological investments for several countries. As argued above, the most 
recognized reason for EMNEs undertaking CBMAs in DEs is to acquire 
new knowledge and new capabilities. Knowledge-seeking activities are 
fundamental drives of competitiveness (Eden and Miller, 2004). CBMAs are 
particularly important for firms that intend to obtain tacit and 
organizationally embedded resources as such knowledge is hard to reach 
and understand through other means such as licensing (Zaheer and 
Hernandez, 2011). Thus host countries with knowledge advantages attract 
CBMAs. This thesis has received strong support in the literature. Kogut and 
 Chang (1991) show that Japanese FDI is attracted to the US because of the 
latter’s R&D base. Berry (2006) confirms that the strong technological 
capability of the US attracts Japanese knowledge-seeking FDI, but it is the 
leading Japanese technological firms that are investing in R&D in the US. 
Nachum et al. (2008) use a sample of 556 US MNEs making 138,050 
location choices in 119 countries and discover that a country’s proximity to 
world knowledge affects the likelihood of it being chosen as an FDI location. 
Shan and Song (1997) find that in biotechnology, foreign firms make equity 
investments in US firms with large patent stocks in order to draw upon that 
local knowledge.  
 
This study argues that KD is also of importance in influencing MNEs’ 
location decisions. A more distant country from a knowledge perspective 
offers sources for more novel and diverse ideas. The further the MNE goes 
from its traditional and original knowledge base, the more it is likely to 
encounter novelty in ideas (Zaheer and Hernandez, 2011). This yields the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: The larger the knowledge distance between the home and the host 
countries, the more CBMAs are undertaken by EMNEs in DEs. 
 
While this idea has been documented in prior research, few studies 
explicitly test the positive relationship between KD and the number of 
 CBMAs. Anand and Kogut (1997) employ the difference between the home 
and the host countries’ R&D intensity and find this variable to be negative, 
but statistically insignificant. Pugel et al. (1996) pay attention to both the 
home and the host country R&D, but not the difference between the two, 
and find that the share of industry value produced by foreign firms increases 
with host country R&D, but not with home country R&D. 
 
3.2.5 Global-Connectedness Distance (GCD) 
 
GCD is a concept that has received little attention in the FDI and the CBMA 
literature. GCD reflects the heterogeneity between countries in their 
connectedness to the rest of the world and captures the extent to which a 
country interacts with, obtains information from, and diffuses activities to 
other countries (Oxley and Yeung, 2001, Berry et al., 2010). MNEs benefit 
from more accurate and faster exchanges with economic agents in host 
countries.  
 
The main channels through which countries interact with each other are 
tourism and internet use. International tourism gives prospective investors 
the opportunity to obtain first-hand information about the country and 
reduces information asymmetry. Sanford and Dong (2000) and Goldberg et 
al. (2005) find that there is a positive relationship between tourism and FDI 
 in the US. The internet provides the potential for transforming businesses 
and making them more efficient and innovative (Guillén and Suárez, 2005). 
It allows firms to overcome barriers and improve their ability to participate 
in international business and integrates businesses in different countries and 
facilitates knowledge transfer. Oxley and Yeung (2001) find that more 
internet use leads to wider cross-country business activities. Gholami et al. 
(2006) confirm that a higher level of information and communication 
technology use and investment leads to an increase in inward FDI.  
 
GCD is important when MNEs engage in CBMAs. Larger distance is 
associated with higher levels of information asymmetry. Information 
necessary in aiding senior managers to plan and execute their CBMA 
activities would be more difficult and costly to acquire in distant countries 
than in close countries. In turn, it is often problematic to evaluate the 
targeting firms and monitor and enforce contracts in distant countries, 
making CBMAs in such countries risky. On the other hand, acquirers with 
informational advantages can avoid competition, hence buying undervalued 
assets. Lower levels of GCDs offer MNEs the opportunities to access the 
information needed for profitable acquisitions and to increases the chance of 
finding the optimal targets, thus making these host countries more valuable 
investment locations than they would be otherwise. This study therefore 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
 H5: The smaller the global-connectedness distance between the home and 
the host countries, the more CBMAs will be undertaken by the EMNEs in 
DEs. 
 
3.2.6 Demographic Distance (DD) 
 
Studies on the role of demographic distance in CBMAs are very limited, if 
any. However demography including age structure and life expectancy is a 
recognized as dimensions of cross-country differences (Whitley, 1994, 
Berry et al., 2010). DD can affect consumer behaviours, market 
attractiveness to firms, and their potential growth. The lifecycle hypothesis 
states that people have different consumption and investment patterns at 
different stages of their lives (Ando and Modigliani, 1963, Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1988). Hung et al. (2007), for example, identify three generation 
cohorts in China: Red Guards influenced by the Cultural Revolution in 
1966-1979, Modern Realists coming of age during the Economic Reform 
(1980-1991) and Global Materialists born after the Cultural Revolution and 
the implementation of the one-child policy and how they hold different 
behaviours. The Red Guards are likely to be pessimistic in their outlook and 
behave conservatively. The Modern Realists are entrepreneurial and seek 
novelty. The Global Materialists have stronger orientation towards 
conspicuous consumption than the generations before them. Further, they 
 find Chinese and Americans of similar ages (and life cycle stages) hold 
different values. Red Guards in China and baby boomers in the US were 
born around similar periods but have different spending patterns on homes 
and cars. Such DD across countries have fundamental implications for MNE 
strategy. It is not hard to imagine complications that would likely arise when 
taking a set of business practices and routines established following certain 
demographic characteristics into an economy that possesses a different 
demography. On the other hand, EE and DE country pairs that share similar 
demographics may experience more CBMAs. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H6: The smaller the demographic distance between the home and the host 
countries, the more CBMAs will be undertaken by EMNEs in DEs. 
 
3.2.7 Administrative Distance (AD) 
 
AD underlines the differences between countries in bureaucratic patterns 
due to colonial ties, languages, religions, and legal systems (Berry et al., 
2010). Makino and Tsang (2011) argue that informal ties between countries 
developed through colonization, shared language, shared religion, and 
common origin of the legal system are path-dependent and tend to have 
persistent effects. They create an incentive structure for economic 
exchanges. When countries share colonial history, language, religion and 
 legal systems, there is little or no uncertainty associated with transactions. 
MNEs, therefore, may find it relatively easy to deal with CBMAs in both 
ex-ante assessments of target values and ex-post integration. Small AD also 
enhances the social relationships between MNEs and local stakeholders; as 
a result, MNEs are likely to find that with relatively low information costs, 
it is relatively easy to gain legitimacy in the host country that is closer to the 
home country in an administrative dimension (Konara and Wei, 2013). The 
above arguments, to a large extent, have received support in the existing 
literature. Hejazi and Ma (2011) show all components of AD except colonial 
ties affect inward and outward FDI stocks. A similar result is found by 
Ahern et al. (2013) in examining CBMAs. Oh et al. (2011) examine all 
components of AD except religion. Though the coefficients on colonial ties 
and language have expected signs, sharing a common legal system appears 
to have a negative impact on FDI, albeit with weak statistical significance. 
Konara and Wei (2013) find negative effects of language and religion 
distance on FDI. Other studies that examine one or all of the components of 
AD include Coeurdacier et al. (2009), Lubatkin et al. (1998), and Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), Di Giovanni (2005), Hyun and Kim (2010). These, too, 
reveal that small AD facilitates bilateral investment and other business 
activities. Therefore, I posit that:  
H7: The smaller the administrative distance between the home and the 
host countries, the more CBMAs will be undertaken by EEs in DEs. 
 3.2.8 Cultural Distance (CD) 
 
CD is the most widely studied concept in CBMA research. CD reflects how 
individuals from different countries observe and react differently to certain 
behaviours and their attitudes towards authority, trust, family and work 
(Berry et al., 2010). Strategic decisions and actions of top managers are 
often influenced by their cultural background (Hofstede, 1980). Coeurdacier 
et al. (2009) argue that CD can be important in affecting the acquirers’ 
perceptions of targeted firms in CBMAs. High CD can be perceived as 
involving high post-merger management costs (Kogut and Singh, 1988, 
Ahern et al., 2013). The perception of overcoming time-consuming and 
costly inter-cultural conflicts and co-operation reduces the willingness of 
MNEs undertaking CBMAs (Weitzel and Berns, 2006). 
 
Further, differences in CD add to the liability of foreignness, information 
and communication costs, and uncertainties of international transactions 
(Eden and Miller, 2004). CD is closely linked to information asymmetry that 
exists between the negotiating parties to a transaction. Following transaction 
cost economics, information asymmetry is positively associated with the 
seller’s incentives to misrepresent the value of the item being offered up for 
sale, a very important issue for CBMAs in the valuation of assets.  
 
 Because of CD, MNEs may find it is more difficult to establish social 
legitimacy than regulative legitimacy (Quer et al., 2012, Kang and Jiang, 
2012). CD may prolong the host country’s “continuing suspicion towards 
the MNE” (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) and adversely affect the MNE’s 
legitimacy building (Luo and Shenkar, 2006). Given the extent of 
operational interactions with economic agents in different countries, 
CBMAs are particularly sensitive to cultural distance. Prior empirical 
studies confirm that cultural proximity increases the number of CBMAs 
between countries (Malhotra et al., 2011, Shimizu et al., 2004, Coeurdacier 
et al., 2009, Malhotra et al., 2009, Ahern et al., 2013). Hence, I propose the 
final hypothesis: 
H8: The smaller the cultural distance between home and host countries, 
the more CBMAs are undertaken by EEs in DEs. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodology  
 
This analysis is based on data gathered from two sources: the SDC Platinum 
Database and Berry et al. (2010). The SDC reports CBMA data completed 
by EMNEs in the OECD countries during the 01/01/2001-31/12/2011 period. 
Berry et al. (2010) provide data for eight dimensions of institutional 
distance between acquiring and targeting countries. Eight countries (Chile, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
 Turkey) considered emerging economies became members of the OECD 
during the sampling period. Given the research interests, they are retained in 
the EE category. The full list of the EEs this study considered is provided in 
the Appendix 1. The final sample this study worked with contains 1,895 
completed CBMA transactions by EMNEs from 43 EEs in 26 OECD 
countries during the period of 2001-2011. 
 
In line with extant research (e.g. Coeurdacier et al., 2009, Di Giovanni, 
2005, Hyun and Kim, 2010, Kiymaz, 2004, Malhotra et al., 2009, Malhotra 
et al., 2011, Manchin, 2004, Markides and Ittner, 1994, Rossi and Volpin, 
2004, Uddin and Boateng, 2011, Zhang et al., 2011), I use the number of 
completed CBMA deals by EMNEs from country i to an individual OECD 
country j in year t as the dependent variable. The SDC also reports 
transaction values; however, information is rather incomplete for EMNEs. 
Therefore, I used the number of CBMA deals, rather than their values, as the 
dependent variable, as the former is a better indicator of firms’ behaviour 
(Malhotra et al., 2009).  
 
I combined the number of CBMA deals with the independent measures of 
institutional distance provided by Berry et al. (2010). In addition to the eight 
dimensions of institutional distance, geographic distance (GD) is included in 
the analyses because it has long been recognized as important to CBMAs 
 (Zaheer and Hernandez, 2011, Hyun and Kim, 2010). Table 6 shows the 
components of the eight dimensions of institutional distance and geographic 
distance. Each distance index is integrated and calculated with different 
component variables; that is, the distance index not only tries to cover the 
most popular variables, but also considers the calculation of distances 
between pairs of countries. The final sample includes 785 paired-country 
observations.  
 
The dependent variable, the number of CBMAs deals, is a count data series, 
which takes discrete integer values and presents considerable overdispersion 
(the variance being greater than the mean). Thus, a generalized linear model 
(GLM) assuming a Poisson or negative binomial distribution is called for. A 
Poisson process describes events that happen independently and randomly 
in time. The probability that the number of CBMA deals (yi) will occur 
given a set of explanatory variables xi can be represented by the equation.  
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However, the Poisson model needs to meet the requirement of equality 
between its first two moment conditions. Because of the unobserved effects, 
such as the uncertainty inherent in undertaking CBMA deals, a problem of 
‘overdispersion’ may occur, whereby the conditional variance exceeds the 
conditional mean. In this case, a negative binomial model can be used to 
overcome the problem as it offers a more efficient estimator than a Poisson 
 model. Both models can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis. A review 
of the correlations between the explanatory variables indicates that 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue except between ED and KD given 
their slightly high correlation coefficient. However, VIF (variance inflation 
factor) scores range between 1.01 and 2.24, which is much lower than the 
rule of thumb threshold value of 10. I therefore conclude that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this analysis.  
  
 
Table 7 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable Mean s.d. PD ED FD KD GCD DD AD CD 
Number of CBMAs 2.414 4.003         
Political distance (PD) 162.138 76.726         
Economic distance (ED) 13.644 9.450 0.340        
Financial distance (FD) 7.291 5.659 0.097 0.131       
Knowledge distance (KD) 11.475 10.902 0.448 0.650 0.257      
Global-connectedness 
distance (GCD) 46.162 1097.708 -0.001 0.003 0.013 -0.003     
Demographic distance (DD) 14.856 14.403 -0.165 -0.176 -0.028 -0.142 -0.007    
Administrative distance (AD) 16.742 20.244 -0.138 -0.099 -0.132 -0.070 -0.013 -0.063   
Cultural distance (CD) 70.511 23.629 0.397 0.403 0.085 0.307 0.049 -0.048 -0.285  
Geographic distance (GD) 6692.606 3828.563 0.405 0.300 0.071 0.358 0.040 0.002 -0.251 0.343 
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Table 8 presents the empirical findings using a number of different 
techniques including (1) ordinary least squares, (2) Poisson, and (3) 
Negative Binomial models. All three specifications (1)-(3) yield 
qualitatively similar results. The likelihood-ratio tests for overdispersions 
are statistically significant, however, implying that the negative binomial 
models should be the relevant bases for the analysis.  
 
Table 8 Estimation Results of Determinants of CBMAs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS Poisson Negative Binomial 
PD 0.009
***
 
(0.002) 
0.004
***
 
(0.001) 
0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
ED 0.026
*
 
(0.015) 
0.008
*
 
(0.005) 
0.010
*
 
(0.005) 
FD -0.005 
(0.025) 
-0.0003 
(0.010) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
KD 0.039
**
 
(0.019) 
0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
0.012
**
 
(0.005) 
GCD (x 10
-3
) -0.581
***
 
(0.159) 
-0.305
***
 
(0.005) 
-0.302
***
 
(0.004) 
DD  -0.0005 
(0.006) 
-0.0006 
(0.003) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
AD -0.015
***
 
(0.004) 
-0.008
***
 
(0.002) 
-0.006
***
 
(0.002) 
CD -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
GD (x 10
-3
) 0.408 
(0.461) 
0.174 
(0.166) 
0.006 
(0.115) 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
N 785 785 785 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, # < 0.12 
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The results show that the PD, ED, KD, GCD and AD are statistically 
significant with their expected signs, while the FD, DD, CD and GD are 
statistically insignificant. These confirm that, when EMNEs undertake 
CBMAs in DEs, they pay particular attention to distance between their 
home and their host countries in the areas of politics (political stability, 
democracy and trade bloc membership), economics (economic development 
and macroeconomic characteristics), knowledge (patents and scientific 
production), global connectedness (tourism and internet use), and 
administration (colonial ties, language, religion, and legal system), 
supporting H1, H2, H4, H5 and H7. Cross-country differences in financial 
sector development, demography, culture and geography have little impact 
in their location decisions. Thus the sample fails to support H3, H6 and H8. 
Discussion of these results in detail is below.  
 
Theoretically, PD can encourage or discourage CBMAs from EEs to DEs. 
The results indicate that EMNEs undertake CBMAs in the OECD countries 
in order to escape the political constraints that they face at home, for 
example extensive government intervention, high regulatory uncertainty, 
insufficient intellectual property rights protection and other legal protections, 
and weak market monitoring mechanisms. At the same time, they tap into 
well-established institutions which support them in their acquisition and 
assimilation of advanced resources and capabilities and reduction of 
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transaction costs. Hence the larger the PD is, the higher will likely be the 
number of CBMAs.  
 
The impact of ED and KD on CBMAs is positive, confirming the 
strategic-asset seeking or knowledge-seeking nature of EMNEs in the 
OECD countries. CBMAs help EMNEs access target firms’ strategic assets, 
such as advanced proprietary technology, production knowledge, managerial 
expertise, patents, brands and goodwill, that are valuable to them in upgrade 
existing FSAs to higher standards. For these EMNEs, the larger ED and KD 
imply that more opportunities are available in the host countries.  
 
GCD and AD act as significant impediments to EMNEs’ CBMAs, while 
similarity between home and host countries in both dimensions gives 
EMNEs confidence to undertake more CBMAs in the OECD countries. 
When EEs are well connected to the rest of the world, they are more open 
and active in international business (Guillén and Suárez, 2005). Global 
connectedness offers EMNEs wide selection of targets and reduces time and 
costs associated with CBMAs. Both tourism and the internet provide 
channels for them to understand the rest of the world. The internet is 
particularly more powerful as it breaks many constraints associated with 
time and space and makes information circulation extensive and transparent 
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(Oxley and Yeung, 2001). The finding of the negative coefficient on AD is 
unsurprising and in line with the existing literature as shown in section 3.2. 
 
Among the eight dimensions of institutional distance, EMNEs appear to pay 
little attention to FD, DD and CD. Although EMNEs can raise funds in host 
countries, given their inexperience with international financial markets and 
their strong domestic bases for finance, they are less likely to pay attention 
to FD between the home and the host countries. EMNEs operating in the 
OECD countries tend to be more of strategic-assets-seeking than 
market-seeking types; therefore, DD is of little relevance. Though the 
coefficient on CD is statistically insignificant, it is likely that its effects have 
been picked up by AD through colonial ties, common language, common 
religion, and similar legal systems. It is similarity in history, language, 
religion and the law that matters to EMNEs, rather than the distance in 
power, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity.    
 
Finally, the result finds very little impact of GD on CBMAs, which is 
consistent with Coeurdacier et al. (2009), but contradicts others’ findings 
(Di Guardo et al., 2013, Di Giovanni, 2005, Hyun and Kim, 2010, Malhotra 
et al., 2009). Coeurdacier et al. (2009) argue that the improvements in 
information technologies may reduce information costs substantially which 
render GD irrelevant. For the sample, given the geographical locations of 
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DEs and EEs, it is likely that the benefits of political systems, economic 
development and knowledge stock of the OECD countries, close integration 
with the rest of the world, close colonial ties and shared common language, 
religion and legal systems have overriding effects on EMNEs’ location 
decisions, regardless how far DEs are away from their home countries.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The concept of institutional distance between the home and the host 
countries of MNEs has increasingly attracted researchers’ attention (Eden 
and Miller, 2004, Xu and Shenkar, 2002, Kostova, 1997). Theoretically, 
institutional distance can be argued to affect EMNEs’ CBMA location 
decisions positively or negatively. The extant literature in this area has not 
agreed on how to operationalize institutional distance. The concept is often 
boiled down to political, economic, cultural, or administrative dimensions 
and overlooks other dimensions such as financial, knowledge, 
global-connectedness and demographic characteristics of the home and host 
countries. Based on Berry et al. (2010) comprehensive conceptualization of 
institutional distance, the aim of this study is to explore how individual 
components of institutional distance has a meaningful and theoretically 
discernible impact on EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs. The concurrent role of 
multiple dimensions of institutional distance is investigated based on a 
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sample containing 1,895 completed CBMA transactions by EMNEs from 43 
EEs in 26 OECD countries during the 2001-2011 period. 
 
My choice to focus on EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs is based on two reasons. 
First, the existing literature on CBMAs has focused primarily on the 
traditional players, i.e. the DMNEs. EMNEs are increasingly becoming 
important players. It is important to know how they react to institutional 
distance. Second, EEs and DEs are characterized by substantial differences 
in terms of institutions. In DEs, the established institutions provide 
sufficient protection for market behaviours and knowledge development, 
while in EEs, the institutions are fragile and legal protections are inadequate, 
there is potentially a high threat of opportunism and local firms may have 
less confidence in knowledge creation. EMNEs investing in the OECDs 
through CBMAs represent a challenging but interesting scenario.  
 
The main theoretical contribution of my study is to offer a unique 
perspective to understand EMNEs’ CBMA activities through an 
investigation of the multi-dimensional nature of institutional distance. This 
helps capture a broad picture of one of MNEs’ critical strategic decisions. In 
linking macro institutions to micro strategic decisions, I have further 
developed and advanced a key insight of institutional theory; the firm’s 
strategy should be embedded in the dynamics of institutions.  
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This study has theorized and found that not all distance dimensions have a 
negative impact on CBMAs. Most of the existing literature tends to link 
institutional distance to high transaction costs, high uncertainties and risks, 
and strong barriers that constrain information flows. However, distance 
could also be an opportunity for a firm. The strategic-asset seeking is the 
main purpose of EMNEs’ CBMAs, comparing to the market seeking 
CBMAs by DMNEs. Domestic constraints are not the barrier of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs, but the motives for better institution in DEs, such as IPR 
protection and managerial skills. As argued by He and Wei (2013), distant 
markets provide a strong basis for knowledge acquisition and differentiation. 
In fact, risk perceptions of a distant market may elicit a strong desire for 
organizational learning. The combination of newly acquired knowledge and 
skills from a well-developed environment with the firm’s existing FSAs 
developed from the home country can lead to unique resource and capability 
creation which offers a source of competitive advantage. Moreover, to add 
more insights in existing literature with the explicit consideration of 
different institutional distances, I found that more common language and 
active immigration can reduce the effect of cultural barrier. More internet 
use and infrastructure development offer more possibility of EMNEs’ 
CMBAs. 
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The policy implication of this study is clear. Emerging economy 
governments have recognized the benefits of their MNEs’ CBMAs and have 
attempted to guide EMNEs. The findings show that attentions should be 
paid to the institutional environments of both the home and the host 
countries, simultaneously. The awareness of political, economic and 
knowledge distance between home and host countries could lead EMNEs to 
merge or acquire firms in more distant countries and benefit from economic 
gains that can compensate for perceived risks and uncertainties associated 
with distant countries. Relative to developed countries, an emerging 
economy home country government should try to improve their country’s 
distance along the dimensions of global connectedness and administrative 
links. The convergence to developed countries’ standards in these two 
dimensions can lead EMNEs to better integrate cross-border economic 
activities and empower them to be in strong positions in information and 
knowledge exchanges.  
 
The research has important managerial implications. A strategic decision 
such as the location choice of CBMAs in DEs should be based on the 
evaluation of optimum risk-adjusted benefits. There are benefits as well as 
costs associated with undertaking CBMAs in an institutionally distant 
country. Understanding the systematic institutional differences between 
countries is crucial. It is only through making sense of these differences that 
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EMNEs can adapt their organizational practices and internal procedures to 
managing these differences and ensuring organizational success.  
 
Those dimensions of institutional distance, i.e. political, economic and 
knowledge, that have a positive impact on CBMAs tend to have a more 
formal nature, and therefore are relatively easy to understand. EMNEs may 
find that it is relatively easy to adapt their practices and routines in response 
to distance in these dimensions. Those dimensions of institutional distance, 
i.e. global connectedness and administrative, that have a negative impact on 
CBMAs tend to have a more informational nature. Adaptation to 
institutional pressures along these dimensions may be more challenging.  
 
Finally, managers may want to factor institutional distance into their target 
prices. On the one hand, political, economic and knowledge distances offer 
EMNEs opportunities to escape from home country institutional constraints 
and acquire strategic assets so that there is potential room for adjusting 
target prices upwards. Hope et al. (2011) find that acquirers from EEs have a 
systematic tendency to bid higher in order to acquire assets in DEs. They 
attribute this to national pride and potentially elevated levels of managerial 
hubris (some of which may be coated by national pride). However, it is also 
likely that the overpayment indicates managers’ awareness of the benefits 
from some dimensions of institutional distance. On the other hand, 
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global-connectedness and administrative distance can negatively affect 
EMNEs so that there should also be room for adjusting target prices 
downwards.  
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Chapter 4  The Role of Political Institutions in 
EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD Countries 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In recent decades, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) have 
experienced a phenomenal growth. This is partly fuelled by the continued 
development of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from developed 
economies (DEs). But increasingly MNEs from emerging economies (EEs) 
have ascended to the world stage and taken leading positions in a number of 
industries such as container shipping, petroleum refining, steel, mining, 
electronics and telecommunications (UNCTAD, 2000, UNCTAD, 2007, 
UNCTAD, 2011). Unlike their counterparts in DEs, MNEs from EEs 
(henceforth EMNEs is used) usually do not possess firm-specific advantages 
that can act as ownership advantages, one of the three conditions for a firm’s 
internationalisation in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). It has been highlighted in the literature that institutions play an 
important role in these firms’ internationalisation, particularly political 
institutions (Benassy - Quere et al., 2007, Bevan et al., 2004, Coeurdacier et 
al., 2009, Gelbuda et al., 2008, Mudambi and Navarra, 2002, Peng et al., 
2008) (henceforth, the word institution refers to political institutions unless 
specified differently).  
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The institutional factors can be categorised into two types: push factors in 
home countries and pull factors in host countries. Home country 
institutional weakness is a push factor. Inefficient government, a weak legal 
system, poor property rights and high political risk all contribute to EMNEs’ 
strong incentives to operate overseas to avoid risk and high transaction costs 
in the domestic market (Buckley et al., 2007, Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 
2012). Push factors also include home country government support, policy 
promotions and liberalization. To improve firm competitiveness, EE 
governments support EMNEs to seek advanced technologies and strategic 
assets that are mostly available in DEs (Buckley et al., 2007, Luo et al., 
2010). In spite of growing recognition of the role of home country political 
institutions in EMNEs’ cross-border activities, both theoretical development 
and empirical evidence on the topic remain limited (Wu and Chen, 2014). 
However, the home country institutional factors may also hinder outward 
foreign direct investment (FDI). A favourable climate at home may attract 
firms to stay at home and reduce their propensity to invest abroad. Existing 
empirical studies on the role of home country institutions are limited.  
 
More attention has been paid to the pull factors of host countries, the 
locational advantage emphasized in Dunning’s eclectic paradigm. Daude 
and Stein (2007) explore the importance of a wide range of institutional 
factors including the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, an 
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excessive regulatory burden, government instability and lack of 
commitment, and find a positive relationship between institutions and FDI. 
Clarke (2001) finds that good political institution can have a positive impact 
on inward FDI, because high institutional quality positively impacts on 
technology upgrading. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) look into FDI and 
institutions in developing countries and find improved political governance 
in developing countries may result in more inward FDI. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007) also support this finding and find that better government 
effectiveness and legal system and less corrupt government attract more 
inward FDI. Better legal systems in host countries lead to less corruption, 
thereby reducing the possibility of losing the business (Gani, 2007). Other 
studies with similar findings include, for example, Bevan et al. (2004), 
Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Jensen (2008). However, there are also 
studies that do not find evidence of any significant effect of institutions on 
FDI (Wheeler and Mody, 1992, Fan et al., 2009). 
 
In view of the lack of empirical studies on home country institutional factors 
and the mixed findings on host country institutional factors, this chapter 
adds to the FDI literature in several ways. First of all, this study considers 
home and host country institutions in an integrated framework. Existing 
research often treats these two groups of variables separately. There are 
studies that examine institutional distance between home and host countries 
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which show that CBMA deals are often significantly influenced by the 
differences between home and host country political institutions (Shimizu et 
al., 2004), but MNEs may not always compare home country institutions 
against host country institutions. It is likely that they consider both groups 
of variables at absolute terms simultaneously. Second, the study develops 
hypotheses based on the concepts developed by (Kaufmann et al., 1999): 
voice and accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. At 
the conceptual level, under the broad umbrella of political institutions, a 
wide range of factors has been covered in the literature. But with the 
exception of Globerman and Shapiro (2002), existing studies only examine 
limited aspects of institution. Globerman and Shapiro (2002), on the other 
hand, have not paid attention to whether the above six dimensions of 
political institutions may have different effects on FDI. Therefore, this study 
tries to answer this research question: What is the role of political 
institutions in location choice in EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries? 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an 
overview of existing literature on political institutions and FDI in general, 
and on CBMAs, a specific form of FDI, in particular. Following on from the 
review, I propose hypotheses on the impact of political institutions on the 
CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs. Section 4.3 describes data, variables and 
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methodology. Section 4.4 discusses empirical results and findings, followed 
by the conclusion in section 4.5. Contribution and implications are also 
discussed in the final section. 
 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
With the booming economy in developing countries and their firms’ 
increased venturing into the world stage, existing studies have increasingly 
focused on the role of institutions (Benassy - Quere et al., 2007, Globerman 
and Shapiro, 2002, La Porta et al., 1999, North, 1990, Oliver, 1997). 
Different dimensions to institutions have been examined including politics, 
economics, finance, administration, knowledge, global connectedness, 
demography and culture. This study will focus on political institutions. 
Following Kaufmann et al. (2012), political institutions have six dimensions: 
voice and accountability (VA), political stability (PS), government 
effectiveness (GE), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of law (RL) and control of 
corruption (CC). Together they build trust and credibility, prevent illegal 
opportunists and regulate business activities, and can affect perceptions and 
intentions in foreign business investment transactions and the economic and 
strategic choices of firms (Oliver, 1997). Linkage between institution and 
FDI, which includes CBMAs and greenfield investment, has increasingly 
gained academic attention.  
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Existing literature distinguishes institutional factors into pull factors in host 
countries and push factors in home countries (Jormanainen and 
Koveshnikov, 2012, e.g. Benassy - Quere et al., 2007, Luo et al., 2010, e.g. 
Gani, 2007, Buckley et al., 2007, Dikova and Van Witteloostuijn, 2007). 
Pull factors in host countries are often argued to positively influence inward 
FDI. Institutionally well-developed countries enjoy locational advantages: 
for example, a transparent and well-functioned host country government 
reduces uncertainty and political instability; “good” institution can bring 
more property and investor protection; a well-structured legal system in host 
countries leads to less corruption, and thereby provides more investor 
protection and reduces the possibility of losing the business (Gani, 2007). 
Therefore, countries with “good” institutions are more likely to receive 
more FDI. 
 
As mentioned earlier, most of the empirical research on institution and FDI 
in general and CBMA in particular is carried out from the perspective of the 
host country. MNEs come into contact with host country institutions when 
they operate in the country and the continuity of these operations is 
constrained by the host country institutions. The early attempt by Wheeler 
and Mody (1992) does not provide significant evidence of the impact of 
good host institutions, measured by the risk index which contains political 
stability, corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal system, on US FDI. 
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However, this study sparks further research on institution and FDI. Studies 
by Wei (1997) suggest corruption significantly inhibits inward FDI. Stein 
and Daude (2001) find that not only corruption but also other institutional 
factors, for example government effectiveness and political stability, have a 
significant and economically important impact on FDI. Furthermore, they 
show that not all institution factors have the same level of impact on FDI 
decision-making, with government effectiveness being the most important 
institutional factor, followed by political stability. Clarke (2001) finds that 
good institutions can have a positive impact on FDI, because good 
institutional quality positively impacts on technology upgrading. Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002) examine 144 countries and confirm that good 
institutions attract inward FDI. In large developed countries, institutions, 
characterized by policies promoting competition, open and transparent legal 
and regulatory regimes and effective delivery of government service, create 
a favourable climate for FDI. However, because their dataset is not bilateral 
FDI flows between host and home countries, they also suggest further 
research can be based on the bilateral FDI flows to compare and contrast 
home versus host country institutions. Benassy - Quere et al. (2007) also 
support the previous finding that better government effectiveness, and legal 
system and less corrupt government attract more inward FDI. On the other 
hand, the findings of a positive link between host country institutions and 
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inward FDI is not universal. Fan et al. (2009) show that poor quality 
institutions in China do not act as a deterrent to FDI inflows. 
 
Emerging economies have been playing a major role on the international 
business stage for decades. They not only act as a receiver of FDI, but also 
actively invest overseas. Especially since the start of the twenty-first century, 
more and more EMNEs have been participating in FDI activities, in 
particular CBMAs (Stein and Daude, 2001, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). 
Different from their counterparts from DEs, EMNEs do not have 
firm-specific advantages such as advanced technologies, know-how, 
marketing techniques and well-established distribution networks that can act 
as ownership advantages for firms to overcome the “liability of foreignness” 
in the host country. Instead, they invest in DEs to acquire firm-specific 
assets which can be integrated into their system so that they can gain 
firm-specific advantages. It has been argued that these EMNEs are “pushed” 
by their home country institutions to go abroad for different reasons. First, 
because EEs’ institutional weaknesses, such as inefficient government, a 
weak legal system, poor property rights protection and high political risk, all 
give EMNEs strong incentives to operate overseas to avoid their own risk 
and high transaction costs in the domestic market (Buckley et al., 2007, 
Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). Second, there are also positive push 
factors such as home country government support, promotions policies and 
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liberalization. EE governments encourage domestic enterprises to invest 
overseas by providing stable and supportive regulation and institution 
(Buckley et al., 2007, Luo et al., 2010). Empirical studies on institution and 
FDI from the home country perspective are limited. Globerman and Shapiro 
(2003) consider that the relationship between home country institutions and 
outward FDI is complex. On the one hand, a favourable home country 
business environment limits capital outflows. On the other hand, these same 
factors may also encourage the growth of domestically owned MNEs that 
then establish their foreign affiliates. The empirical investigation of 144 
countries shows that improvements in home country institutions restrict FDI 
for very small economies. For most countries, the effect of institution on 
FDI is positive. Wu and Chen (2014) investigate two dimensions of home 
country institution, the level of institutional development and institutional 
instability, and find that the former has a positive impact while the latter has 
a negative impact on the propensity of 921 Chinese firms for foreign 
expansion during 1996-2000.  
 
The literature discussed so far shows, at the conceptual level, under the 
broad umbrella of political institutions, a wide range of factors have been 
considered, for example political stability, corruption, bureaucratic quality, 
legal system and government effectiveness. With the exception of 
Globerman and Shapiro (2002), existing studies only cover limited aspects 
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of institution. The empirical chapter adopts the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) framework developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999), 
Kaufmann et al. (2000) to analyse political institutions. There are six 
dimensions to political institutions: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and 
control of corruption. This framework is very comprehensive and has been 
widely used in institution research (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Gani, 
2007, Globerman and Shapiro, 2003, Globerman and Shapiro, 2005, Hur et 
al., 2011, Mengistu and Adhikary, 2011, Stein and Daude, 2001, Wernick et 
al., 2009). The following will discuss the impact of each dimension of 
political institution on CBMAs in the context of EE being home countries 
and DEs being host countries.  
 
4.2.1 Voice and Accountability (VA) 
 
Voice and accountability captures the extent to which a citizen can 
acknowledge and participate in a country’s political and government 
activities, such as elections and policy making, and also associate with free 
access and expression with the independent media. In other words, VA is 
linked to democratic decision-making and media independence. As 
democratic institutions provide checks and balances on elected government 
officials and transparent political systems, which are likely to reduce 
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arbitrary government intervention, lower the risk of sudden policy change, 
strengthen property rights protection and improve the quality of information 
flows (Holmes et al., 2013), it is expected that FDI would be attracted to a 
host country in DEs with favourable conditions in VA.  
 
However, from the home country perspective, the impact of VA on CBMAs 
by EMNEs is less clear at the theoretical level. EEs tend to have weak 
democratic institutions. Governments rely less on popular support, citizens 
tend to be less informed about and influential on government activities, and 
government officials are more self-serving and more likely to manipulate 
institutions for personal gain (Holmes et al., 2013). As a consequence, on 
the one hand, successful firms may enjoy the favours and protections 
offered by autocratic government and exploit their oligopolistic and 
monopolistic positions at home, therefore having fewer incentives to invest 
abroad. On the other hand, they may be encouraged by autocratic 
government to internationalise to acquire strategic assets abroad. Thus the 
overall effect of VA in the home country on FDI is an empirical question. To 
summarize the above discussion, only one hypothesis about the positive 
relationship between the level of VA of a host DE and CBMAs by EMNEs 
can be clearly formulated. The impact of VA of a home EE on CBMAs by 
EMNEs could be positive, negative or negligible if the positive effects are 
balanced out by the negative effects. 
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H1: The higher the VA of the host DE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
 
There are a few empirical studies of the role of the host country VA. 
However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no empirical study that 
examines the role of home country VA. In Stasavage’s (2002) study of FDI 
and political institutions, it is found that when the host country moves from 
an authoritarian system with less public acknowledgement and supervision 
to a democratic system with legitimate and executive supervisions of a 
separate and independent media and public, the inflow of FDI into the 
country can increase by 16% in a long-term effect. Harms and Ursprung 
(2002) show a positive relationship between democracy and FDI, which 
means that MNEs prefer to invest in countries where civil rights and public 
freedom are respected. Similarly, Busse and Hefeker (2007) find democratic 
rights are significant to FDI inflows, and MNEs prefer democratic 
destinations because these can be supervised by public media and can be 
considered as “transparent”. Though these empirical studies are based on 
inward FDI in developing countries, the findings may also be applicable to 
DEs. Many EEs are moving towards better political institutions, including 
giving VA to their citizens. For example, India and Mexico are learning 
from western examples. Even socialist countries such as China, compared to 
their past, act much more transparently and give their citizens more political 
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rights and civil liberties. 
 
4.2.2 Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS) 
 
Political stability (PS) and absence of violence captures the level of stability 
in political and constitutional conditions. Political instability and violence 
may disrupt the economic process, damage infrastructure, impose financial 
constraints on the country and crowd out investments in other areas such as 
education and public health. They may also be associated with regime 
change that can potentially create additional difficulties for firms, including 
the threat of nationalisation, expropriation, capital control and high tax rates. 
Political instability and violence could also obstruct business operations, 
affect the effectiveness of resource allocation and increase transaction costs. 
From the perspective of the host country, it is straightforward that political 
instability and violence discourage inward FDI. From the perspective of the 
home country, political instability and violence encourage outward FDI as 
investors try to avoid the possibility that the uncertainty and risks could 
erode the future value of their assets holding. In the context of DEs as host 
countries and EEs as home countries, it can be safely argued that a 
politically more unstable EE is likely to push EMNEs abroad, while stable 
and mature DEs as host countries provide the needed institutions for EMNE 
investors. As a long-term strategy, CBMAs are more likely to happen in host 
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countries with low levels of uncertainty, violence and terrorism as they 
creates a stable institution for foreign investors (Hur et al., 2011). Therefore 
I convey the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The higher the PS and absence of violence of the host DE, the more 
CBMAs are undertaken by EMNEs. 
H2b: The lower the PS and absence of violence of the home EE, the more 
CBMAs are undertaken by EMNEs. 
 
A number of empirical studies clearly show that stable political institutions 
with a competitive business environment are a significant determinant of 
inward FDI and this applies to both developed countries and developing 
countries. Schneider and Frey (1985) reveal the reduction of FDI inflows in 
developed countries when domestic PS decreases, a result further confirmed 
by Asiedu (2006) study of FDI in Africa. Based on FDI inflows into Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC) countries from 1984 to 2002, Mina (2009) 
shows that foreign investors prefer more stable institutions as the target. 
Hayakawa et al. (2013) examine FDI inflows including both developed 
countries and developing countries from 1985 to 2007, and find that the low 
level of PS reduces FDI inflows. Brada et al. (2006) study FDI inflows into 
Balkan countries during the period 1991-2001, and show that FDI is 
significantly reduced because of the war effects. They suggest that foreign 
investors avoid investing in host countries when their perception of 
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instability exceeds the expected level. Especially in the Balkan cases, 
foreign investors can expect much more stability in western European 
countries than Balkan countries. Hayakawa, Kimura et al. (2013) also 
include the conflicts factor in their study, and show the negative effect of 
frequent internal conflicts in either developed countries or developing 
countries on FDI. However, there are also studies that find no significant 
relationship between FDI and political instability (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001).  
 
Empirical studies on FDI from the perspective of PS of the home country 
are limited. However, there are some studies on political risks and capital 
flight. For example, Le and Zak (2006) and (Lensink et al., 2000) find a 
positive relationship between political instability and capital outflow. This 
can be indirect evidence of the suggested positive relationship between 
political instability of the home country and outward FDI. Moreover, for 
emerging countries with rapid growth, political instability limits the local 
firm to domestic expansion and also raises the worries of nationalisation. 
Investing in stable and regulated western DEs is shown to be the good way 
to diversify the risk (Mengistu and Adhikary, 2011).  
 
4.2.3 Government Effectiveness (GE) 
 
Government effectiveness (GE) includes the quality of civil and public 
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service by government and the degree of independence of the service from 
political influence. These reflect the credibility of government commitment 
to the public. Host countries design and perform effective government 
services to attract foreign investors, because higher GE lowers the cost 
barrier of entry.  
 
While DEs are considered to have an “effective government and invest 
environment”, EEs are more likely to be less effective, with excessive and 
unclear regulations. EMNEs can break out of the home country constraints 
by acquiring oversea targets. Malhotra et al. (2009) also argue that effective 
government encourages outward CBMAs. CBMAs increase according to the 
perception of lower co-ordination costs and a less time-consuming process 
in home countries for domestic enterprise to go overseas. Thus, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H3a: The better the GE of the host DE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
H3b: The better the GE of the home EE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
 
There are a small number of empirical studies that investigate explicitly the 
role of GE in FDI and CBMA decisions. In the study of US inward and 
outward CBMAs from 1989 to 1999, Kiymaz (2004) shows that foreign 
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investors, in anticipation of the wealth gains and returns from the lower 
information costs and easier operation management of investing in US, 
invested in the US. Likewise, US bidders tend to choose targets from the 
institution with effective government. The empirical results of Malhotra et al. 
(2009) indicate that EEs tend to invest in DEs to avoid their own domestic 
barriers caused by ineffective home government, and also with the help of 
the improvement of home GE. Mengistu and Adhikary (2011) reveal that 
even when EEs invest in developing countries, EMNEs still prefer targets 
from countries with relatively more effective governments  
 
4.2.4 Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
 
Regulatory quality (RQ) represents the ability of government to formulate 
and implement policies that promote, permit and regulate public and private 
sectors. In other words, governments can not only produce market-friendly 
policies to attract FDI inflows, but also execute regulations to influence 
market price and supervise bank operations for foreign investment and 
business development. The regulatory role of government is a fundamental 
determinant to FDI inflows in host countries (Busse and Groizard, 2008, 
Asiedu, 2006, Asiedu, 2004, Davidson, 1989). A good regulatory system 
provides a creditable and consistent investment environment which 
enhances the confidence of foreign investors. Open policies boost FDI 
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inflows in host countries. Better RQ increases the inward CBMAs (Hur et 
al., 2011). However, it is not about individual policies in host countries. It is 
essential to provide an integrated regulation framework to liberalize the host 
market through effective supervision. To be more specific, both the lack of 
host government regulatory functions and highly restricted regulations lead 
to less FDI inflows, because institutional void and highly regulated 
economies create market distortion (Busse and Groizard, 2008). Compared 
with EEs, DEs are known for a comprehensive and extensive regulation 
framework, which can be attractive to EMNEs in their quest for strategic 
assets to improve their competitive advantages. 
 
Although EEs impress the world with rapid economic development, 
political institutions are weaker than DEs, and EEs learn from DEs when 
making economic and development policies. Poor RQ and high restrictions 
limit domestic firms from expanding internally, and force local firms to seek 
chances internationally (Campos and Kinoshita, 2002). On the other hand, 
EEs traditionally have tight control on outward FDI (Rasiah et al., 2010). 
The improvement and promotion policies in EEs move more slowly than the 
long-standing weak regulatory framework. A large number of EEs do not 
provide supportive policies on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) 
(Sauvant et al., 2009). For EMNEs, domestic government is not always 
supportive; in order to break the constraints and compete with counterparts 
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from DEs, EMNEs expand into better regulated institutions to achieve 
competitive advantages. Hence I propose two possibilities for RQ of the 
home country: 
H4a: The higher the RQ of the host DE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
H4b: The lower the RQ of the home EE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
 
Empirical studies looking at the impact of RQ are few and they all focus on 
host countries. Taylor (2000) argues that when host countries only promote 
trade policies such as a low tax tariff, it is inadequate. Policy restrictions on 
technology transfer in a host country reduce FDI inflows, as foreign 
investors fear the investment to be non-beneficial and expropriate. Taylor 
(2000) also suggests that both trade and investment open policies are 
important to attract FDI. Azémar and Desbordes (2010) examine US FDI 
outflow into both developed and developing countries over 1983 to 1993, 
and find that deregulation and active labour policies in host countries boost 
the FDI inflows, lift the possibility for highly skilled workers to find a job in 
the active labour market, and promote the acquirers’ incentives to achieve 
human resource advantage. They also reveal the positive effect of open 
economic policies on FDI inflows. Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) show that an 
effective regulation framework is a transparent and independent system 
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apart from political interference. 
 
4.2.5 Rule of Law (RL) 
 
Rule of law (RL) postulates the fairness and power of a law system to 
protect society, property rights, contracts enforcement and other economic 
development. A powerful and fair judiciary and court in host countries 
enhance the foreign investors’ confidence in the protection of contracts 
enforcement. An effective and law system also prevents and reduces crime 
and other illegal activities; thus foreign investors can perceive a secure 
business environment in host countries. Better RL can increase CBMAs in 
host countries. Meanwhile, La Porta et al. (1999) classify that various 
worldwide legal systems all inextricably derive from four types of legal 
origins: English common law, the civil law of French, German or 
Scandinavian origin, and socialist law. Both La Porta et al. (2000), in their 
further research, and Levine (1999) argue that legal systems with English 
common law origins can protect investors and shareholders better. They 
suggest that economic development can be more effective and secure in host 
countries under English common law, which results in more FDI inflows.  
 
In the meantime, the low level of legal infrastructure in home EEs forces 
domestic firms to acquire overseas. A high risk of corporate value 
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appropriation in EEs exists, which deters the expansion of EMNEs (Rasiah 
et al., 2010). Lee and Mansfield (1996) point out the intellectual property 
rights (IPR) protection in developing economies is very low. Hence EMNEs 
transfer their knowledge to better legal institutions for strong protection. 
Also EMNEs perceive the contract enforcement and supervision is not 
guaranteed in the home EE. Without effective and legal regulations, 
commitments in business activities in EEs may be unpredictable and 
unreliable. EMNEs seek better investor protection overseas because of the 
lack in home countries (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Therefore, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
H5a: The better the RL of the host DE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
H5b: The weaker the RL of the home EE, the more CBMAs are 
undertaken by EMNEs. 
 
Existing empirical studies focus on the RL in host countries, while attention 
on the RL in home countries is limited. Rossi and Volpin (2004) particularly 
examine the impact of investor protection and CBMAs in 49 countries 
between 1990 and 1999. Results show more CBMAs occur in countries with 
higher investor protection. They conclude the reason is that corporate 
control becomes ineffective and low when shareholder protection is low. 
Private arbitrage benefits from weak corporate control and operation, which 
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harms the investor and corporate value. Lee and Mansfield (1996) 
conducted research on the relationship between IPR protection in 
developing economies and FDI inflows from US firms, and they indicate 
that strong IPR protection in host countries attracts more FDI inflows. This 
finding is supported by Javorcik (2004); he focused on developing 
economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and shows the 
negative effect of a weak legal system in host countries on inward FDI. 
Campos and Kinoshita (2002) examine the FDI inflows into 25 transition 
economies between 1990 and 1998, and find that foreign investors prefer 
countries with better legal institutions. Poor legal conditions in EEs prompt 
the EMNEs to invest in DEs, as the extensive and comprehensive legal 
practices in DEs provide a safer investment environment and learning 
example.  
 
4.2.6 Control of Corruption (CC) 
 
Control of corruption (CC) captures the degree of government control of 
private gains with public power, including corruption. Corruption in host 
countries increases the unpredictable volume of transaction costs for foreign 
investors. DEs hold the symbol of “clean” government; a high level of CC 
makes foreign investors able to predict the cost of investment to the 
maximum (2000). Moreover, when CC is improved in host countries, it also 
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attracts more FDI (2001), because foreign investors can reduce the cost of 
bank loans and portfolio capital and receive more financial support in host 
countries.  
 
Because of the relatively lower level of CC in EEs, EMNEs suffer from the 
negative influence of domestic corruption. Although EMNEs may be 
familiar with local corrupt institutions, the unpredictable cost brought by 
home market corruption is not a favourable business environment for 
EMNEs (Weitzel and Berns, 2006). In the meantime, literature also points 
out that the improvement of CC in home countries can create a favourable 
business investment at home for EMNEs. Thus CC can enhance the EMNEs’ 
confidence in expanding in the home market rather than going overseas, 
further reducing the outward FDI (Globerman and Shapiro, 2003, Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2002). Therefore, two hypotheses can be formulated: 
H6a: The better the CC of the host DE, the more CBMAs are undertaken 
by EMNEs. 
H6b: The weaker the CC of the home EE, the more CBMAs are 
undertaken by EMNEs. 
 
Empirical studies mainly focus on host countries rather than home countries. 
Even EEs are analysed as host countries for FDI inflows. Wei (2000) 
analyses the relationship between FDI inflows and corruption based on FDI 
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data from 12 home countries to 45 host countries during the early 1990s, 
and shows that less CC and a high level of corruption in the host countries 
have a significant negative impact on FDI inflows. Results also suggest that 
corrupt host countries receive less FDI because foreign investors suffer from 
the high cost of bank loans and portfolio capital in host countries. Existing 
literature also finds that when CC in host countries gets better, FDI inflows 
rise significantly. Vittal (2001) points out the FDI flow to India can increase 
by 12% if corruption is strictly controlled in India, and he also suggests that 
FDI in China could be doubled if the Chinese government reduces red tape 
and corruption. Besides Asian developing countries, African developing 
countries can benefit from CC as well. A study shows that when Nigeria 
manages to reduce the corruption level to that of Hong Kong between 1974 
and 1989, a 5% increase is added to FDI inflows in Nigeria (Brunetti et al., 
1997).  
 
By taking the example of Japanese outward FDI into 59 host countries, 
Voyer and Beamish (2004) find that when Japan as the home country tends 
to target less corrupt countries, less Japanese FDI flows into countries where 
an undeveloped legal system hardly restricts activities and a high level of 
corruption exists. A similar result is found in the studies of EEs’ outward 
FDI (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002, Al-Sadig, 2009), when the lower level of 
CC in the home market increases the EEs’ outward FDI in DEs where the 
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corruption is better controlled. Globerman and Shapiro (2003) point out that 
the relationship between better home country institutions and outward FDI 
can be negative. Favourable home country institutions created by improved 
CC limits capital outflows. Their empirical investigation of 144 countries 
shows that improvements in home country institutions restrict FDI for very 
small economies. For most countries, the effect of institution on FDI is 
positive. 
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
 
4.3.1 Data and Variables 
 
This empirical analysis is based on data gathered from four main sources: 
the SDC Platinum Database, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2012), the World Trade Organization 
WTO) Regional Trade Agreements database and institution distance indices 
(Berry et al., 2010). SDC reports CBMAs completed by EMNEs in the 
OECD countries during 01/01/2000-31/12/2011. The WGI (Kaufmann et al., 
2012) measures political institutions on six indicators: voice and 
accountability, political stability and no violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Berry et al. (2010) 
provide data for control variables of eight dimensions of institutional 
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distances (e.g. economic distance) between acquiring and targeting countries. 
Eight countries (Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, 
Slovak Republic and Turkey) considered as emerging economies also 
became members of the OECD during the sample period. Given the 
research interests, they are retained in the EE category. The full list of EEs is 
provided in Appendix 1. The final sample contains 2,906 completed CBMA 
transactions undertaken by EMNEs from 43 EEs in 26 OECD countries 
during the period 2000-2011. The final sample includes 1,086 
paired-country observations. 
 
Following existing studies (e.g. Coeurdacier et al., 2009, Di Giovanni, 2005, 
Hyun and Kim, 2010, Kiymaz, 2004, Malhotra et al., 2009, Malhotra et al., 
2011, Manchin, 2004, Markides and Ittner, 1994, Rossi and Volpin, 2004, 
Uddin and Boateng, 2011, Zhang et al., 2011), the study uses the number of 
completed CBMA deals by EMNEs from country i to an individual OECD 
country j in year t as the dependent variable. SDC also reports transaction 
values; however, the information is rather incomplete for EMNEs. Therefore 
the number of CBMA deals is chosen, rather than the values, as the 
dependent variable, as the former is a better indicator of firms’ behaviour 
profiles (Malhotra et al., 2009).  
 
The model combines the number of CBMA deals with independent 
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measures of six governance indicators from the WGI (Kaufmann et al., 
2012). The WGI has been widely tested by a number of previous scholars, 
and is proven to be the established and comprehensive method for 
institution quality research (Busse and Hefeker, 2007, Gani, 2007, 
Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Globerman and Shapiro, 2005, Hur et al., 
2011, Jensen, 2008, Mengistu and Adhikary, 2011, Stasavage, 2002, 
Wernick et al., 2009). Based on 31 separate data sources provided by 
various organizations, WGI index combines a large number of qualitative 
and quantitative variables into six governance indicators. They improve the 
dataset in 2009, which covers 212 countries and territories over the years of 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to 2008 (Kaufmann et al., 2009). The recent 
version was updated in 2012, and it covers 230 countries and territories over 
the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to 2011 (Kaufmann et al., 2012).  
 
The choice of control variables is based on existing literature. The most 
controlled factors are economic factors (GDP per capita, inflation rate and 
GDP growth rate) and infrastructure factors (internet use) (Coeurdacier et al., 
2009, Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, Darby et al., 2010, Globerman and Shapiro, 
2002, Hur et al., 2011, Kirkpatrick et al., 2006, Mengistu and Adhikary, 
2011, Singh, 2012, Wernick et al., 2009). I also add four more control 
variables: knowledge factors, administrative factors, EU dummy variable 
and RTAs. EU dummy variable means EU = 1 when the host country is an 
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EU member, otherwise 0. Therefore, the study employs economic distance, 
knowledge distance, global-connectedness distance and administrative 
distance from the institution distance indices by (Berry et al., 2010). In order 
to minimize the effect of national co-operation, I employ the number of 
physical RTAs by home and host countries as the control variable (Asiedu, 
2006, Di Giovanni, 2005). The WTO Regional Trade Agreements database 
provides the data for the full list of the number of physical RTAs signed by 
each country.  
 
4.3.2 Regression Model 
 
The dependent variable, the number of CBMA deals, is a count data series, 
which takes discrete integer values and presents considerable overdispersion 
(with the variance being greater than the mean). A generalized linear model 
(GLM) assuming a Poisson or negative binomial distribution is called for. A 
Poisson process describes events that happen independently and randomly 
in time. The probability that the number of CBMA deals (yi) will occur 
given a set of explanatory variables xi can be represented by the equation:  
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However, the Poisson model needs to meet the requirement of equality 
between its first two moment conditions. Because of the unobserved effects, 
such as the uncertainty inherent in undertaking CBMA deals, a problem of 
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‘overdispersion’ may occur, whereby the conditional variance exceeds the 
conditional mean. In this case, a negative binomial model can be used to 
overcome the problem as it offers a more efficient estimator than a Poisson 
model. Both models can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. 
Equations below show the regression (1): 
CBMA number =  α0 + αn ∙ WGI + βn ∙ controls +  ε      (1) 
 
Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. A review of 
correlations between WGI variables shows that the multicollinearity can be 
observed. Thus, this empirical study follows the established researches to 
test each political institutions factor in a separate regression, which is 
supported by existing studies (Globerman and Shapiro, 2002, Globerman 
and Shapiro, 2003, Globerman and Shapiro, 2005). They suggest that WGI 
indictors are highly correlated to each other, so it is not possible to examine 
them all in one regression, and a single regression should be run to test each 
of the WGI factors.  
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Table 9 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable Mean s.d. homeva homeps homege homerq homerl homecc hostva hostps hostge hostrq hostrl hostcc hostrta 
Number of 
CBMAs 
2.681  4.152  
             
homeva -0.184  0.826  
             
homeps -0.228  0.785  0.222  
            
homege 0.246  0.502  0.316  0.694  
           
homerq 0.216  0.531  0.428  0.737  0.835  
          
homerl 0.028  0.562  0.363  0.708  0.792  0.781  
         
homecc -0.050  0.600  0.363  0.791  0.822  0.848  0.851  
        
hostva 1.324  0.219  0.052  0.024  0.061  0.066  0.069  0.056  
       
hostps 0.702  0.485  0.053  0.041  0.061  0.066  0.066  0.033  0.648  
      
hostge 1.597  0.399  0.056  0.026  0.060  0.072  0.059  0.060  0.801  0.611  
     
hostrq 1.489  0.285  -0.007  0.002  0.047  0.053  0.048  0.028  0.616  0.358  0.647  
    
hostrl 1.541  0.374  0.002  0.013  0.084  0.061  0.059  0.029  0.773  0.669  0.758  0.700  
   
hostcc 1.637  0.566  0.034  0.039  0.085  0.078  0.080  0.054  0.834  0.638  0.844  0.745  0.855  
  
hostrta 13.202  10.374  0.088  0.129  0.037  0.115  0.135  0.101  0.015  -0.015  -0.141  -0.026  -0.122  -0.095  
 
homerta 25.616  11.348  0.460  -0.102  -0.005  0.088  -0.009  -0.214  0.038  0.056  0.024  -0.028  0.004  0.026  0.109  
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Table 10 shows the estimation results of political institutions variables. 
Reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, reg5 and reg6 are separate estimations of WGI 
variables. Six control variables of ED, KD, GCD and AD, EU dummy and 
RTAs are included in each regression. H2a, H3b, H4a, H4b, H5a, H5b, H6a 
and H6b are fully supported. The estimation results fail to support H1, H2b 
and H3a.  
 
Table 10 Estimation Results of Political Institutions 
 
 reg1 reg2 reg3 reg4 reg5 reg6 
Number       
Homeva -0.095      
 [0.073]      
Hostva 0.212      
 [0.171]      
Homeps  -0.240***     
  [0.061]     
Hostps  -0.039     
  [0.087]     
Homage   -0.105    
   [0.081]    
Hostge   0.190***    
   [0.072]    
Homerq    -0.456***   
    [0.089]   
Hostrq    0.581***   
    [0.135]   
Homerl     -0.127**  
     [0.059]  
Hostrl     0.356***  
     [0.083]  
Homecc      -0.294*** 
      [0.071] 
Hostcc      0.189*** 
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      [0.055] 
Homerta 0.008** 0.008** 0.005 0.015*** 0.006* 0.005 
 [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] 
Hostrta 0.065*** 0.048*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 
 [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.017] [0.016] 
EU -1.995*** -1.544*** -1.855*** -1.810*** -2.050*** -2.031*** 
 [0.368] [0.394] [0.383] [0.371] [0.401] [0.375] 
AD -0.006*** 
[0.002] 
-0.006*** 
[0.002] 
-0.006*** 
[0.002] 
-0.005*** 
[0.002] 
-0.007*** 
[0.002] 
-0.006*** 
[0.002] 
KD (x 10
-3
) 
 
0.002 
[0.005] 
-0.001 
[0.003] 
0.013 
[0.011] 
0.003 
[0.003] 
0.001 
[0.003] 
0.002 
[0.005] 
ED 0.015*** 
[0.005] 
0.016*** 
[0.004] 
0.016*** 
[0.005] 
0.014*** 
[0.004] 
0.013*** 
[0.004] 
0.014*** 
[0.004] 
GCD (x 10
-3
) 
 
-0.042*** 
[0.001] 
-0.011*** 
[0.005] 
-0.051*** 
[0.007] 
-0.037*** 
[0.005] 
-0.021*** 
[0.003] 
-0.078*** 
[0.002] 
N 763 763 763 763 763 763 
R2       
pseudo R2 0.046 0.053 0.047 0.063 0.049 0.053 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, # < 0.12 
 
Estimation results of the WGI factors show PS, RQ, RL and CC are 
statistically significant on the home country side, with expected signs, while 
VA and GE are statistically insignificant on the home country side. GE, RQ, 
RL and CC are statistically significant on the host country side, with 
expected signs, while VA and PS are statistically insignificant on the host 
country side. These imply that on the home country side, the home country 
pays more attention to PS, RQ, RL and CC in its domestic institutions, while 
VA and GE are not influential on the home country effect. On the host 
country side, GE, RQ, RL and CC in the host country have a significant 
function in the decision-making of inward CBMAs, except that VA and PS 
draw less attention. Further discussions are made below. 
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On the home country side, empirical findings support previous scholars 
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2002, Rasiah et al., 2010, Sauvant et al., 2009). 
Poor and constrained RQ in home institutions is still the main push factor 
for EMNEs’ CBMAs. EMNEs escape from the tight political control and 
weak regulatory framework in the home country to DEs. The negative effect 
of PS on home countries in the empirical findings is in line with existing 
literature (Hayakawa et al., 2013, Hur et al., 2011). Comparing with DEs, 
the political stability level in EEs is lower, and it is harmful for local firms 
to expand domestically. EMNEs lower the risk of domestic political 
instability via CBMAs. It is not hard to conclude that more violence and an 
unstable investment environment impede domestic development, but more 
go-out activities occur. The negative result of RL proves that EMNEs are 
concern their high corporate control and value in home country with 
insufficient protection, the enforcement and commitment in contract are 
weak in home market. Hence, when the shareholder protection in the home 
country decreases, more CBMAs occur. The negative effect of CC in the 
home country confirms that the unpredictable cost of operation in the 
corrupt home market in EEs strongly forces EMNEs to acquire overseas.  
 
In addition, VA and GE seem to play an insignificant role in home 
institutions, because when EMNEs acquire targets overseas, information and 
government effectiveness in host countries are much more important than 
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the conditions in the home country. Information asymmetry occurs on the 
host country side. With sufficient acquaintance with their own institutions, 
EMNEs require better information access on their targets. Thus VA and GE 
in EEs become less important.  
 
On the host country side, the empirical results of GE, RQ, RL and CC are 
consistent with the hypotheses and literature. An effective host government 
(GE) reduces the cost barrier of entry and gives the foreign investor the 
perception of easier operation management (Kiymaz, 2004). Better RQ in 
the host country provides a market-friendly policy and institution to foreign 
investors. The integrated regulation framework can liberalize the host 
market with effective supervision. A good regulation system provides a 
creditable and consistent investment environment to enhance the confidence 
of foreign investors in the private sector. Compared with EEs, DEs are 
reputable for their comprehensive and extensive regulation framework, 
which makes them a favourable target as a host country for EEs (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007, Taylor, 2000). Good RQ in DEs has a positive effect on 
attracting inward CBMAs. Therefore, the result supports previous findings 
on RQ that better RQ in DEs can attract more CBMAs from EEs. Advanced 
RL in DEs has extensive and comprehensive legal practices. It enhances the 
foreign investors’ confidence with better shareholder protection and contract 
enforcement, especially because most law systems in DEs are rooted in 
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English common law, and civil law of French, German and Scandinavian 
origin. Economic development can be more effective and secure because of 
these legal origins. In order to obtain more corporate control and 
independent operation for more shareholder value and protection, EMNEs 
escape from a weak legal system to a good legal system (La Porta et al., 
2000, Levine, 1999, Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Most of the literature shows 
the significant positive effect of CC in host countries on attracting CBMAs, 
because high control of corruption prevents bribery. Bribery is considered 
wrong and more costly to foreign investors, which then deters the inward 
CBMAs in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002, Wei, 2000). 
 
Finally, little impact of VA and PS is found in host countries on EMNEs’ 
CBMAs. Existing literature argues that transparent and independent public 
media as a separate party can provide objective and direct supervision, and 
democratic political systems are supposed to be a favourable investment 
environment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007, Stasavage, 2002). A stable political 
institution (PS) lowers the nationalisation risk, and a non-violent market 
reduces the cost of investment by cutting down the insurance premiums of 
foreign investment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007, Jensen, 2008). For the 
adopted sample, DEs from the OECD as host countries all maintain high 
level of PS, so the impact of PS of DEs on EMNEs’ CBMA location choices 
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becomes less sensitive. Therefore, the results show that VA and PS in host 
countries have an insignificant effect on EMNEs’ CBMAs. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This study examines the role of political institutions of both the home 
country (EEs) and the host country (DEs) in EMNEs’ CBMAs. Empirical 
findings show that in the home country, the negative effects of PS, RQ, RL 
and CC are in line with existing literature. Poor and constrained RQ in the 
domestic institution is still the main push factor for EMNEs’ CBMAs 
(Campos and Kinoshita, 2002, Rasiah et al., 2010, Sauvant et al., 2009). 
EMNEs escape from the tight political control and weak regulatory 
framework in the home country to DEs. It is not hard to conclude that more 
violence and an unstable investment environment impede domestic 
development, and more go-out activities occur (Hayakawa et al., 2013, Hur 
et al., 2011). The negative result of RL proves that when the insufficient 
investor protection in the home country decreases, more CBMAs occur. The 
finding of the negative effect of CC shows that a low level of CC in EEs 
increases the cost of domestic business activities for EMNEs, and the 
unpredictable institution forces EMNEs to acquire overseas. However, VA 
and GE seem to play an insignificant role in EMNEs’ CBMAs on the home 
country side, because when EMNEs acquire targets overseas, information 
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and government effectiveness in the host countries are much more important 
than the conditions in the home country. Information asymmetry occurs on 
the host country side. With sufficient acquaintance of their own institutions, 
EMNEs require better information access on their targets. Thus VA and GE 
in EEs become less important. 
 
On the host country side, the empirical results of GE, RQ, RL and CC are 
consistent with the hypotheses and literature. Effective host government 
(GE) reduces the cost barrier of entry and gives the foreign investor the 
perception of easier operation management (Kiymaz, 2004). Better RQ in 
the host country provides a market-friendly policy and institution for foreign 
investors. The integrated regulation framework can liberalize the host 
market with effective supervision. A good regulation system provides a 
creditable and consistent investment environment to enhance the confidence 
of foreign investors in the private sector. Compared with EEs, DEs are 
reputable for their comprehensive and extensive regulation framework, 
makes them a favourable target as a host country for EEs (Busse and 
Hefeker, 2007, Taylor, 2000). Good RQ in DEs has a positive effect on 
attracting inward CBMAs. Therefore, the finding supports previous findings 
on RQ that better RQ in DEs can attract more CBMAs from EEs. Advanced 
RL in DEs has extensive and comprehensive legal practices. It enhances the 
foreign investors’ confidence with better shareholder protection and contract 
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enforcement, especially because most of the law systems in DEs are rooted 
in English common law, and civil law of French, German and Scandinavian 
origin. Economic development can be more effective and secure because of 
these legal origins. In order to obtain more corporate control and 
independent operation for more shareholder value and protection, EMNEs 
escape from a weak legal system to a good legal system (La Porta et al., 
2000, Levine, 1999, Rossi and Volpin, 2004). Most of the literature shows 
the significant positive effect of CC in host countries in attracting CBMAs, 
because high control of corruption prevents bribery. Bribery is considered 
wrong and is more costly to foreign investors, which then deters the inward 
CBMAs in host countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006, Habib and Zurawicki, 
2002, Wei, 2000).  
 
Finally, the results find little impact of VA and PS in host countries on 
EMNEs’ CBMAs. Existing literature argues that transparent and 
independent public media as a separate party can provide objective and 
direct supervision, and a democratic political system is supposed to be a 
favourable investment environment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007, Stasavage, 
2002). A stable political institution (PS) lowers the nationalisation risk, and 
a non-violent market reduces the cost of investment by cutting down the 
insurance premiums for foreign investment (Busse and Hefeker, 2007, 
Jensen, 2008). For the adopted sample, DEs from the OECD as host 
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countries all maintain high levels of PS, so the impact of PS of DEs on 
EMNEs’ CBMA location choices becomes less sensitive. Therefore, VA and 
PS in host countries have an insignificant effect on EMNEs’ CBMAs. 
 
Although the findings are in line with existing literature, the chapter 
theoretically contributes to the existing literature with several points. First, it 
adds to the literature by studying both EEs as the home country and DEs as 
the host country, with the comprehensive WGI framework. Existing 
literature mostly focuses on either DEs as the home country, or EEs as the 
host country. The existing academic work on EEs as the home country is 
very limited. This research enriches the theoretical pool with six explicit 
dimensions of political institutions. Second, in contrast with existing 
theoretical studies, this research proves that not all the political institutions 
are important in EMNEs’ CBMAs. Moreover, this study theoretically 
contributes that effects of same political institutions of target and acquirer 
countries are different. Scholars should consider the situation that positive 
political institutions in DEs can be negative in EEs. Findings of the 
significant positive relationship between hostGE, hostRQ, hostRL, hostCC 
and EMNEs’ CBMAs support the existing literature on DMNEs’ CBMAs. 
Findings of insignificant hostVA and hostPS on EMNEs’ CBMAs suggest 
that DEs from the OECD as host countries all maintain a high level of PS, 
so the impact of incidents between DEs on EMNEs’ CBMA location choices 
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becomes less sensitive. 
 
This research has important implications at both government and managerial 
levels. For EEs, supportive go-out policies and improving government 
effectiveness can always promote EMNEs’ CBMAs. It significantly helps 
the domestic firms to acquire targets overseas. For DEs, an active exposure 
on the international stage with good institutions and supportive policies can 
attract more inward CBMAs. For the managerial level of EMNE and DE 
firms, strategic assets and human resources at the firm level are no longer 
the only main determinants. Managers should evaluate the political 
institutions when they are choosing locations and searching for targets. The 
effect of institution can be vital and costly. 
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Chapter 5  The Impact of Institutional Distance on 
the Performance of Acquired Firms by EMNEs in the 
OECD Countries 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs) by multinational 
enterprises from emerging economies (EMNEs) have attracted considerable 
attention from both policymakers and academia (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). 
As latecomers to the international market, EMNEs utilise CBMAs to swiftly 
acquire strategic assets, such as advanced marketing skills, superior R&D 
ability, managerial know-how assets and human assets, access to new 
markets and improved capabilities (Buckley et al., 2007, Kedia et al., 2012, 
Luo and Tung, 2007, Shimizu et al., 2004, Lu et al., 2011, Buckley et al., 
2014), compensating for their competency deficiency. Developed economy 
(DE) firms possessing strategic assets are important targets for these 
EMNEs. At the same time, these DE firms need the strong financial support 
from these EMNEs and their assistance in accessing a new, large market. 
CBMAs are therefore considered by managers of both the acquired and the 
acquirer firms as a way to improve firm performance (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
However, EMNEs potentially face additional challenges derived from their 
country of origin. They need to overcome unfamiliarity, relational and 
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discriminatory hazards to establish legitimacy in the host country market. 
The acquirer and the acquired firms also need to trust each other, integrate 
with each other and achieve synergy between them. These pose further 
threats to the performance of the EMNEs’ operation in developed countries. 
Can the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs be improved?  
 
Firm performance associated with CBMAs has been widely investigated, 
drawing insights mostly from accountancy, finance, economics and 
management (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). However, these studies are mostly 
in the context of developed countries. Examination of CBMAs by EMNEs 
is a relevantly new research area and the focus of these studies tends to be 
on individual countries or a small number of countries, for example India 
and China, and on the performance of the acquirer firms (e.g. Aybar and 
Ficici, 2009, Gubbi et al., 2010, Nicholson and Salaber, 2013, Bhagat et al., 
2011, Boateng et al., 2008). To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
research that investigates the performance of the acquired firms of EMNEs 
in DEs, with the exception of Buckley et al. (2014).  
 
In terms of the theoretical approaches that have been employed to 
understand the performance consequence of CBMAs by EMNEs, a majority 
of the literature focuses on internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 
2009) and the resource-based view (Buckley et al., 2014). This is surprising 
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given the fact that a large number of studies of EMNEs have emphasized 
different institutional contexts between emerging economies (EEs) and DEs 
(Hyun and Kim, 2010, Malhotra et al., 2009, Luo et al., 2010, e.g. Di 
Giovanni, 2005). DEs tend to have developed institutions characterized by 
well-developed factor markets, few government interventions and an 
effective mechanism for contract enforcement. The costs of doing business 
there are likely to be low, which facilitates economic activities. EEs tend to 
have less advanced or incomplete institutions and local firms face 
constraints resulting from insufficiently developed market-supporting 
institutions as well as additional hazards, restrictions and costs. As 
recognized by institution theory, the success of a firm is not only a matter of 
organizational learning and firm attributes, but is also influenced and shaped 
by the institutional context within which the firm operates. The institutional 
context determines the costs and complexity of business transactions, which 
has a direct bearing on firm performance. In the context of EMNEs in DEs, 
I expect this is a sphere where national formal and informal institutional 
factors play a greater role than in the context of multinational enterprises 
from DEs (DMNEs) in DEs. To what extent EMNEs can adapt to the DE 
institutional context and improve the performance of acquired firms is 
therefore an important research question. To fill the research gap, I take the 
institution-based view to answer the question: How does institutional 
distance matter to the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in DEs?  
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My study contributes to the existing CBMA literature in several ways. 
Regarding CBMA research, I develop and test a conceptual framework that 
approaches the performance question of EMNEs’ CBMAs from an 
institution perspective, highlighting the effects of institutional distance (ID) 
between the home and host countries on the performance of acquired firms 
of EMNEs in DEs. In so doing, my study moves away from the sole focus 
on firm-level variables emphasized in internalization theory and the 
resource-based view to incorporate institutional factors. Thus this research 
complements the only study of the performance of acquired firms of 
EMNEs in DEs, by Buckley et al. (2014), which mainly focuses on the 
firm-level factors of EMNEs’ tangible resources and acquisition experience. 
Different from existing literature on the role of institutional distance in firm 
performance, I also recognize the different dimensions of institutions – 
formal institutions and informal institutions – and argue that institutional 
distance does not always have a negative impact on firm performance. In the 
context of EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs, formal institutional distance is likely to 
have a positive impact on the acquired firm performance, while it is 
informal institutional distance that is likely to negatively affect the acquired 
firm’s performance.   
Empirically, my dataset covers multiple-host and multiple-home countries in 
recent years when EMNEs have had substantial activities in DEs (EMNEs 
from 37 EEs in 24 DEs during 2000-2010). The wide geographic cover of 
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the sample across a relatively long time period provides potentially good 
variance to examine firm performance of EMNEs, which minimizes the 
likelihood that the results are driven by the idiosyncrasies of a specific home 
or host country. The findings help provide new insights into EMNEs’ 
CBMAs in different institutional contexts and broaden my understanding of 
complicity associated with firm performance of EMNEs. 
 
This research topic is important, and of growing concern to policymakers, 
practitioners and researchers because CBMAs are, next to strategic alliances 
and joint ventures, one of the most important foreign entry modes in a firm’s 
internationalisation. EMNEs’ success in DEs depends on how well they 
understand and appreciate the institutional differences between their home 
and host countries. From the perspective of home and host country 
governments, there is often discrepancy between their expectations. Home 
country governments often encourage EMNEs to invest in DEs so as to 
bring the knowledge and learning back home, which will not only benefit 
the EMNEs per se, but also generate spillover effects which benefit partners 
of EMNEs and other domestic firms. On the other hand, EMNEs’ CBMAs 
in DEs are sometime met with hostile reactions from the host country 
government and general public. Governments therefore need to understand 
the institutional factors that influence EMNEs’ success in DEs.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 provides a literature review 
and develops hypotheses. Section 5.3 explains data and methodology. 
Section 5.4 presents the results of regressions. Section 5.5 discusses 
empirical findings and implications, and is followed by the conclusions in 
section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
5.2.1 Institution and CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs 
 
North (1990) argues that institutions provide the rules of the game that 
organizations have to follow in their interactions with various actors in 
societies. These rules of the game impose both formal constraints and 
informal constraints on organization behaviours, strategies and practice. 
Formal constraints refer to laws, constitution and regulations. Informal 
constraints refer to conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes 
of conduct. An alternative definition of institutions is provided by (Scott, 
1995) as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour”. Thus the institutional 
framework has three pillars – cognitive (the widely shared social knowledge 
and perceptions of what is typical or taken for granted), normative (social 
norms, values and beliefs that define what is appropriate and right for a 
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society’s member) and regulatory (existing laws and rules). Two pillars in 
Scott’s definition – cognitive and normative pillars – are conceptually close 
to each other and to culture, or informal institutions, in North’s definition, 
while the regulatory pillar resembles formal institutions (Scott, 1995). 
Henceforth, in my discussion below, I will focus on formal and informal 
institutions. Dunning and Lundan (2008) indicate that both formal and 
informal institutions are required to build effective and properly-functioned 
markets. In this respect, the formal institutions protect private property and 
enforce the contracts, and informal institutions minimize transaction costs 
and reduce the occurrences of contract renegotiation and conflicts.  
 
In the context of CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs, institutions are particularly 
important. Organizations must follow the rules set up by institutions, but 
institutions are country-specific (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999, Eden and 
Miller, 2004). As far as CBMAs are concerned, this implies that rules, 
regulations and norms of doing business vary across countries. Institutions 
in DEs are characterized by well-functioned factor markets, few government 
interventions and an effective mechanism for contract enforcement. The 
costs of doing business there are likely to be low. In contrast, EEs tend to 
have less advanced or incomplete formal institutions. Local firms face 
constraints resulting from the lack of reliable market information, efficient 
intermediary institutions, predictable government actions and an efficient 
123 
 
bureaucracy (Chan et al., 2008, Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Such 
institutional differences between DEs and EEs present both challenges and 
opportunities to EMNEs.  
 
On one hand, the differences in institutional contexts may present 
challenges as EMNEs face additional hazards, restrictions and costs when 
operating in an unfamiliar context. By definition, a firm is most acquainted 
with its domestic institutional context, both formal and informal. The 
inexperience with different institutions and the problems in managing 
relationships at a distance could lead to “liability of foreignness” and 
additional costs, for example the costs of monitoring and negotiating, 
dispute settlement, opportunistic behaviour of partners and the lack of trust. 
As the institutional differences between the home and the host country 
increase, the costs increase (Gaur and Lu, 2007). On the other hand, 
institutional differences also present opportunities for institutional arbitrage. 
Given the weak formal institutions of their home countries, EMNEs are 
attracted by the strong formal institutions of DEs for strategic-assets seeking 
and new market exploration. As the institutional differences between the 
home and the host country increase, the differences between the resources 
and capabilities of the EMNEs developed at home and the resources 
available in host countries will become more considerable, presenting 
potential benefits from institutional arbitrage (Gaur and Lu, 2007). The role 
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of institutions in CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs therefore is not as clear-cut as 
what has often been portrayed in the literature, i.e. large institutional 
distance only creates barriers and costs to CBMAs (Dikova et al., 2010).  
 
5.2.2 Institution and Firm Performance 
 
According to North (1990), institutions and organizations co-evolve in close 
interaction. The institutional context provides foundations for production of 
firms and business transactions (Trevino et al., 2008). Institutions such as 
rules, laws, routines and norms produce incentives as well as obstacles for 
business activities. Such incentives and constraints structure the 
characteristics, behaviours and managerial actions of firms and the 
interactions between firms, which in turn affect firm performance 
(Schoenberg, 2006, Trevino et al., 2008). Moreover, institutions affect firm 
performance through influencing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
business activities, resource allocations and incentives for business activities 
(Peng et al., 2008). Institution-based knowledge and operations are 
especially needed by firms to become competitive in a specific institutional 
context. Therefore, the success of the firm is not only determined by 
firm-specific factors, such as management skills and organizational learning, 
but is also influenced by the broad institutional context.  
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A strong institutional framework provides a favourable context for firms 
which in turn has a positive effect on firm performance. First, financial 
institutions can offer firms multiple channels for raising funds, and can 
reduce the burden of high costs associated with business activities and 
provide incentives for firms (Schoenberg, 2006). Second, educational 
institutions offer firms a high-quality managerial and technological human 
resource, which is one of the key components of improving firm 
performance (Deng, 2009, Buckley and Casson, 2009). Moreover, firms can 
build links with educational institutions such as research and development 
centres and universities in order to stay close to the frontier of knowledge, 
skills and technologies, with which the quality of products and reputation of 
firms can be improved, which will in turn help firms win more market share 
and gain more profits. Third, legal institutions can protect the interests and 
returns of firms and provide firms with incentives to engage in profitable 
business activities. Strong legal institutions can also detect illegal imitations 
and property right violations and help firms protect their technological 
products and gain high returns from R&D. Fourth, the government and 
political system are an important part of institutions which can affect firm 
performance (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). A successful government should 
implement a set of policies to build strong institutions which are 
constructive for business activities by both MNEs and indigenous firms. 
Such policies include policies to stimulate competition, policies to enhance 
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social cohesion, policies to secure accountability and transparency in 
government, policies to guarantee participation in political system, policies 
to secure the implementation of laws, policies to monitor financial 
institutions, policies to improve communication and transportation 
infrastructures, policies to support the national economy and industries, 
policies to protect intellectual property rights (IPR), and policies to invest in 
educational and R&D institutions. Under such institutions, firm 
performance is likely to experience improvement as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of business activities can be enhanced and the costs and risks 
can be reduced.  
 
On the contrary, under a weak institutional framework, firms are likely to 
engage in costly market transactions and experience less efficient 
transformation. First, weak financial institutions will block a firm’s business 
activities and opportunities for making profits through hindering the 
channels for raising funds and increasing the costs at the same time. Firms 
may lose market opportunities as a result. Second, firms may have difficulty 
in finding qualified and capable employees because of weak educational 
institutions, which may raise their costs of operation because they have to 
seek an alternative stock of human resources or provide training 
programmes. Third, a weak legal institutional framework cannot help firms 
fully protect their interests and returns. A large number of illegal imitators 
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and property right violations may appear due to the imperfections and 
inefficiency in the legal system. Fourth, Trevino et al. (2008) argue that 
over-bureaucratic government, monopolistic control and arbitrarily 
implemented rules could produce negative institutions which restrict the 
creation of profits and returns by firms. A cumbersome institutional 
framework can retard the pace and lower the efficiency of business activities 
(Lipczynski et al., 2005). Under weak government and political institutions, 
firms are confronted by various risks and uncertainties produced by the 
cumbersome institutional framework. The transaction costs of business 
activities may be increased because firms may need to protect their assets 
and prevent the unwanted dissemination of knowledge and information, and 
may face unenforceable contracts (Chan et al., 2008). With lowered 
efficiency and effectiveness, firms may have to invest more resources into 
seeking quality institutional assistance and overcoming institutional barriers. 
The above discussion points to the importance of integrating the 
institution-based view into the analytical framework when investigating 
firm performance. 
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5.2.3 Institutional Distance between Host and Home Countries and the 
Performance of Acquired Firms of EMNEs in DEs 
 
North (1990) suggests that ‘‘the institutions necessary to accomplish 
economic exchange vary in their complexity’’. In this section, I separate out 
the impact of formal institutions and informal institutions on firm 
performance, in particular the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in 
DEs. Formal institutions such as laws, government policies and 
administrative institutions determine the formal structure of rights in 
transactions and exchanges and also determine the costs of making such 
transactions and exchanges (Dikova et al., 2010). The complexity of formal 
institutions in the CBMA is high, as the CBMA firms are affected by both 
the host countries’ formal institutions, such as the regulatory scrutiny upon 
CBMA firms, and the home countries’ formal institutions, such as policies 
of governing outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) (Bittlingmayer and 
Hazlett, 2000). This complexity in the formal institutional context increases 
transaction costs and affects firm performance. From the perspective of 
informal institutions, firms are often deeply rooted in the national informal 
institution of the home country (Dikova et al., 2010). This indicates that any 
changes within a firm may carry some degree of difficulty or sluggishness. 
In the case of CBMAs, it may be demanding to work out how the resources 
of the acquiring firm and those of the acquired firms could be combined and 
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put into their most productive use. This is a process of change and is bound 
to be affected by informal institutions. As argued in the foregoing section, 
the average firm performance is likely to be low in host countries with weak 
institutions and high in host countries with strong institutions. However, not 
all acquired firms of EMNEs are affected equally by the home or host 
country institutions. I will argue below that the performance of acquired 
firms varies according to the formal and informal institutional distance. 
Institutional distance captures the differences between the institutional 
context of two countries (Kostova, 1999).  
 
5.2.4 Formal Institutional Distance  
 
The formal institutional context for firms is complex because they are 
subject to a regulatory scrutiny. Such institutional complexity rises 
significantly in the case of CBMAs, because the nation-specific formal 
institutions of the acquired firms can be different from those of the 
acquirers’. The acquirers typically have a better understanding of their home 
country institutions. Adjusting to an institutional context that is closer to 
home is easier and involves less cost than adjusting to an institutional 
context that is further away from home. Information asymmetry and 
differences in the laws and regulations and government policies may 
significantly increase the costs of business activities and reduce the amount 
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of resources allocated by the acquirer to the acquired firms, affecting the 
performance of the acquired firms negatively (Dikova et al., 2010). For 
example, Australia, Canada, UK, US and other Anglo-Saxon countries 
primarily use the common law system, which is more familiar to Indian 
firms than Mexican firms, who are from a country which employs primarily 
the civil law system. Such differences in legal institutions give more 
pressure for the latter firms to comply with unfamiliar laws, rules and 
regulations, and as a result they incur more costs.  
 
The above arguments, though they appear to be plausible, may not be fully 
applicable to CBMAs by EMNEs in DEs. Following the institutional 
escapism view (Luo et al., 2010, Boisot and Meyer, 2008, Goldstein and 
Pusterla, 2010, Tolentino, 2010, Witt and Lewin, 2007), EMNEs undertake 
CBMAs in DEs in order to seek a better formal institutional context for their 
business, acquire strategic assets to compensate their competitive deficiency 
and improve capabilities. DEs’ well-established institutions ensure 
transparency and contract enforcement, warrant low information 
asymmetries and prompt EMNEs to spend less resources on dealing with 
formal institutions. Therefore, in comparison to EMNEs’ home countries, 
the more distant formal institutional context indicates a better institution for 
the acquired firms of EMNEs. As described by Eden and Miller (2004), 
formal institutions have a codified nature and therefore can be the easiest 
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element for outsiders to observe. Likewise, Gaur and Lu (2007) suggest that 
even when formal institutional distance is large, “foreign firms can easily 
find information about these aspects on their own, using secondary sources”. 
Therefore, on balance, between the extra costs EMNEs incur to familiarize 
themselves with the host country institution and the benefits they gain from 
operating in DEs with strong formal institutions, large formal institutional 
distance may bring good firm performance. 
Hypothesis 1: Formal institutional distance is positively associated with 
the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in DEs.  
 
5.2.5 Informal Institutional Distance  
 
In contrast to formal institutions that offer defined rules of games and firms 
that can relatively easily develop strategies to address these constraints, 
informal institutions stipulate expectations and obligations for behaviour 
that are both internalized by agents and reinforced by the beliefs and actions 
of those with whom they interact and that are a product of both present 
incentives and historical processes. Therefore, informal institutions may be 
mostly opaque to foreign firms. Incompatibilities in social norms, values, 
beliefs and assumptions and other informal constraints can affect 
performance (Dikova et al., 2010). High cultural differences can be 
perceived as involving high post-merger management costs (Kogut and 
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Singh, 1988, Ahern et al., 2013). Overcoming time-consuming and costly 
inter-cultural conflicts in co-operation reduces the performance of CBMAs 
(Weitzel and Berns, 2006). Furthermore, large informal institutional distance 
brings more international transactions costs, because of misrepresentation 
and poor communication between acquired and acquirer firms (Eden and 
Miller, 2004). These differences may prolong the host country’s “continuing 
suspicion towards the MNE” (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
 
Two different managerial teams in CBMAs may resist or find it quite 
time-consuming to learn about and integrate with each other. The 
co-operation with local or domestic firms is likely to be more trustful and 
reliable to the acquired managerial team (Very and Schweiger, 2001, Very et 
al., 1998). Slangen (2006) finds cultural dissimilarities between acquirer and 
acquired firms makes it hard for managers to execute organizational 
practices, and it is more costly to transfer strategic resources. Differences in 
culture may bring conflicts or disputes. In Liu and Buck’s (2009) study of 
CBMAs between Chinese firms (TCL) and French firms (Thomson), one of 
the most important reasons leading to failure is that the “spontaneous” 
French working style cannot cope with the “diligent” Chinese working style. 
Holiday comes second in Chinese firms while it is first to French firms. 
Furthermore, they also find that the success of the Lenovo-IBM ThinkPad is 
powered by assignments of CEOs working with each other to learn and 
133 
 
teach different corporate and social cultures (Liu and Buck, 2009). Slangen 
(2006) also points out that cultural distance can lead to brain drains of 
human resources, and further harm firm performance. Some employees in 
acquired firms are embedded in their own culture (Very and Schweiger, 
2001, Very et al., 1998). They may act with discomfort, or be stressful or 
hostile to CBMAs, especially acquirers from emerging economies. As a 
result, the effects on productivity, R&D and financial resources can reduce 
the firm value (Very and Schweiger, 2001). 
 
In sum, all these existing and potential risks brought by informal distance 
may harm firm performances, especially in the short-term in the beginning 
of the post-acquisition period. 
Hypothesis 2: Informal institutional distance has a negative impact on the 
performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in DEs. 
 
5.2.6 The Empirical Evidence on CBMA Performance  
 
When examining CBMA performance, existing research has employed a 
number of different measures including stock price returns, longevity of the 
venture, survival, deal completion and abandonment, and sales and 
profitability (Shimizu et al., 2004, Dikova et al., 2010, Buckley et al., 2014, 
Zhang et al., 2011). Among these, the most common one is stock price 
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returns, used to focus on pre-event expectation and post-event performance 
by using event study (Zollo and Meier, 2008). Between the pre-event 
expectation and post-event integration processes, the consolidation effect of 
CBMAs can improve the cost and revenue of overall firm performance, 
further reflected by the positive return on the stock price (Fama et al., 1969). 
The performance of CBMAs is examined by focusing on the abnormal 
return of stock price in the post-acquisition period (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986, Rossi and Volpin, 2004, Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Fama et al., 
1969, Markides and Ittner, 1994). For example, Brown et al. (1988) point 
out that a high premium bid offered by acquirers can positively result in the 
increase of stock price return. Brown et al. (1988) show that changes in both 
variance and return caused by events normally lead to a temporary increase 
of abnormal returns. Zollo and Meier (1969) review studies of CBMA 
performance from 1983 to 2007, and find out that short-term performance 
studies focusing on stock prices make up to 40% of total studies. CBMAs 
can positively influence the value creation of overall acquired firm 
performance (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, Jemison and Sitkin, 1986, 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004). However, it can be argued that the short-term event 
study analysis of firm performance can be biased (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991, Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Limited factors are considered in event 
study analysis, especially the missing of some important information, such 
as about the economic and legal system and other institutional factors. 
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Because EMNEs seek intangible assets and resources in DEs, accounting 
factors may better reflect firm performance (Fama et al., 1969).  
 
The empirical studies on the role of institutions in affecting CBMA 
performance are quite limited. Taking the completion of an international 
acquisition deal to be a manifestation of organizational success, Dikova et al. 
(2010) investigate the role of formal and informal institutions and propose 
that both formal and informal institutional distance between the partners’ 
home countries negatively affect the likelihood that an announced 
cross-border acquisition deal will be completed. Based on 2,389 announced 
CBMAs deals in the global service industry between 1981 and 2001, they 
find evidence to support their hypotheses. However, this study does not 
differentiate the countries of origin of the acquirers, nor does it the countries 
of origin of the acquired firms. As my hypotheses above demonstrate, 
countries of origin of both the acquirers and the acquired firm may affect the 
argument.  
 
A few studies have investigated the important role of cultural distance, an 
important part of informal institutional distance, in explaining the 
performance of the acquired firms. Barkema et al. (1996) identify that the 
presence of cultural difference between acquirers and acquired firms in 
CBMAs performs as “barriers” in organization learning of firm performance. 
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Schoenberg (2004) examines both individual management style and 
managerial team compatibility in CBMAs by British firms, and the results 
clearly show that cultural difference brings difficulties in both individual 
management style and managerial team compatibility, and this further 
affects the organizational interaction and post-acquired firm performance. 
Slangen (2006) suggests that there is a negative relationship between 
cultural distance and performance of acquired firms, based on a sample of 
102 CBMA cases carried out by Dutch firms in 30 nations. Stahl and Voigt 
(2005) review the prior research on the effect of culture on CBMAs, 
focusing on the performance implications for firms. They suggest that the 
inconclusive findings from prior literature require further investigation on 
the role of cultural differences in affecting CBMA performance. In summary, 
the existing empirical studies have not paid full attention to the role of 
formal and informal institutional distance/differences in the performance of 
acquired firms of EMNEs in DEs.  
 
5.3 Data and Methodology  
 
5.3.1 Data 
 
My empirical analysis is based on data gathered from three sources: the 
SDC Platinum Database, Lexi-Nexis Academic Universe Database and 
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Berry et al. (2010). SDC reports CBMA deals completed by EMNEs in the 
OECD countries. Lexi-Nexis records financial information of acquired firms, 
such as return on assets and earnings per share. Eight countries (Chile, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Turkey), considered as EEs, became members of the OECD during the 
sample period. Given my research interests, they are only retained in the EE 
category. The full list of involved EEs is provided in the appendices. As a 
result of careful screening of data, deleting observations with missing data 
and collaborating with information from other sources such as company 
websites and company reports, the final sample contains 694 completed 
CBMA transactions by EMNEs from 37 EEs in 24 OECD countries during 
the period 2000-2010 (Appendix 2). The nations of origin of CBMAs in my 
data are listed in Table 11. This sample has a larger size and covers a 
broader range of EEs than recent studies of CBMAs by EMNEs, for 
example by Buckley et al. (2014). For country-level data, Berry et al. (2010) 
provide eight dimensions of institutional distance between countries, 
including political distance (PD), economic distance (ED), financial 
distance (FD), administrative distance (AD), knowledge distance (KD), 
global-connectedness distance (GCD), demographic distance (DD), and 
cultural distance (CD), in addition to geographical distance (GD) (see Table 
6 for variable definition and components).  
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Table 11 Acquirer Nations and Target Nations by Number of CBMAs in 
Data Sample, 2000-2011 
 
Acquirer nation Number of CBMAs  
by acquirer nation 
Target nation Number of CBMAs in 
target nation 
Argentina 6 Australia 107 
Bahrain 9 Austria 7 
Brazil 31 Belgium 6 
Bulgaria 2 Canada 48 
Chile 7 Denmark 8 
China 95 Finland 9 
Colombia 4 France 32 
Czech Republic 2 Germany 47 
Egypt 4 Greece 4 
Estonia 5 Ireland-Rep 1 
Hungary 4 Israel 6 
India 130 Italy 13 
Indonesia 6 Japan 9 
Jordan 1 Luxembourg 1 
Kuwait 9 Netherlands 17 
Latvia 2 New Zealand 3 
Lithuania 4 Norway 12 
Malaysia 44 Portugal 11 
Mauritius 2 South Korea 12 
Mexico 39 Spain 33 
Morocco 1 Sweden 7 
Nigeria 2 Switzerland 7 
Oman 4 United Kingdom 133 
Peru 2 United States 161 
Philippines 7   
Poland 14   
Qatar 17   
Russian Fed 74   
Saudi Arabia 8   
Slovak Rep 6   
South Africa 76   
Thailand 4   
Turkey 7   
Ukraine 2   
Utd Arab Em 59   
Venezuela 2   
Vietnam 3   
Source: Authors’ calculations of data from the SDC Platinum Database. 
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5.3.2 Dependent Variable  
 
Following existing studies (Stahl and Voigt, 2005, Hart and Ahuja, 1996, 
Peng and Luo, 2000, e.g. Agrawal and Jaffe, 2001, Buckley et al., 2014), I 
use the difference of return on assets (ROA) and the difference of earning 
per share (EPS) of the acquired firm between a year before and a year after 
the completed CBMA transaction as dependent variables to capture the 
financial and market aspects of firm performance. The first dependent 
variable – ROA – provides a direct measure of a firm’s profitability, which 
can be linked to other performance measures such as output and sales. The 
second variable – EPS – reflects the market reaction to CBMA deals by 
EMNEs. Together they enable us to investigate the effects of institution-, 
industry- and firm-level variables on the performance change of acquired 
firms before and after CBMA deals, rather than on their absolute value, thus 
avoid biases associated with firm size (Buckley et al., 2014).  
 
5.3.3 Independent Variables 
 
I combine firm-level dependent variables with independent measures of 
institutional distance provided by Berry et al. (2010). My hypotheses relate 
to two categories of independent variables at institutional level: formal 
institutions and information institutions. As per North’s (1990) conception 
140 
 
of institutions, political, economic, financial and administrative distance 
seem to capture the formal institutional aspects, whereas knowledge, 
global-connectedness, demographic and cultural distance are related to the 
informal aspects of the institutional distance between countries. Differently 
from the existing studies of institutional distance, such as Gaur and Lu 
(2007) and Chao and Kumar (2010) that aggregate different measures into 
two distinct variables using factor analysis or weighted average, I separately 
investigate the effects of the different dimensions of formal and informal 
institutional distance on the performance of acquired firms of EMNEs in 
DEs. This will help fully characterize a firm’s institutional context. 
 
In addition to the eight dimensions of institutional distance, I include 
geographic distance (GD) in my analyses because it has long been 
recognized to be important to CBMAs (Zaheer and Hernandez, 2011, Hyun 
and Kim, 2010). Table 6 shows the components of eight dimensions of 
institutional distance and geographic distance. Each distance index is 
integrated and calculated with different component variables, which means 
the distance index not only tries to cover most popular variables, but also 
considers the calculation of distances between pair countries.  
 
141 
 
I include a number of firm- and industry-level control variables: the number 
of employees and net assets (NA). Industry dummies are employed to 
control for the variations in different industries. 
 
5.4 Results 
 
As discussed above, stock price return is often used to measure firm 
performance. Firms in different emerging and OECD countries have 
different stock market indices. Different deal announcement dates provide a 
complex transaction window. These limitations of non-linear stock price 
data make the event study unfeasible. However, I have stock prices data of 
four specified days; I acquired firms’ stock price (i.e. the stock price of the 
acquired firm) on the day of announcement, one day prior to the 
announcement, one week prior to the announcement, and four weeks prior 
to the announcement. A descriptive statistics test is adopted.  
Vt̅
=
1
N
∑(acquired firms′ stock price on the day of announcement
n
n=1
− acquired firms′stock price t day prior to the announcement) 
where  
t = 1 day, 1 week, 4 weeks prior to the announcement 
N = sample size 
Vt̅ = average value of differences between stock prices. 
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Results show that all Vt̅s are positive and when the day comes closer to the 
announcement day, Vt̅ becomes smaller. V1 day̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  =  0.29, V1 week̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  =  0.61,
V4 weeks̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  =  1.11. These results show that EMNEs’ CBMAs can positively 
improve stock prices of the acquired firms. However, the descriptive 
analysis and stock price cannot show what factors influence firm 
performance. Therefore, I implement further regression analysis. 
 
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of 
variables under consideration. A review of the correlations between the 
explanatory variables indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an 
issue except between ED and KD, given their slightly high correlation 
coefficient. However, VIF (variance inflation factor) scores range between 
1.01 and 2.24, which is much lower than the rule of thumb threshold value 
of 10. Thus there are no potential multicollinearity problems.  
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Table 12 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Variable Mean s.d. CD ED GD PD DD AD FD GCD KD NA Employee 
              
ROA 0.6207  2.7537  
           EPS 0.3504  2.7603  
           CD 72.3314  23.2710  
           ED 14.4657  8.1835  0.4138  
          GD 7480.4150  3585.7940  -0.0504  0.2358  
         PD 200.2802  74.7212  0.3248  0.4686  0.2617  
        DD 12.9477  16.1892  -0.0501  -0.3561  -0.3911  -0.0491  
       AD 20.4219  83.9298  -0.2396  -0.2810  -0.0885  -0.4153  -0.2051  
      FD 11.5176  83.7575  -0.1433  -0.0026  0.1528  0.0679  0.0177  -0.1479  
     GCD 11.5198  83.4449  -0.0178  0.0166  0.2373  0.2019  -0.1766  0.1954  0.1865  
    KD 33.2857  194.2587  0.2083  0.6836  0.3586  0.6425  -0.2174  -0.3775  0.1926  0.2092  
   NA 15.4409  10.0781  0.0088  -0.1310  0.0263  -0.1013  0.1267  0.0006  0.1141  0.0037  -0.0989  
  Employee 7721.6050  36424.4900  -0.1652  -0.1607  0.0434  -0.0928  0.0288  0.0689  0.1351  -0.0144  -0.1004  0.6500  
 IID 
  
0.0047  -0.0419  0.0110  0.0566  0.0265  0.0451  -0.0212  -0.0334  0.0153  -0.0074  -0.0355  
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Table 13 presents regression results. The ROA results show ED and PD are 
statistically significantly and positively affect firm performance, while CD 
and KD have a statistically significantly negative effect on acquired firm 
performance. The EPS results show ED, PD and AD have statistically 
significantly positive coefficients, while CD has a statistically significantly 
negative effect on firm performance. These confirm that the acquired firms 
are more likely to be positively influenced by formal institutional distance 
between EMNEs’ home and host countries in the areas of economics 
(economic development and macroeconomic characteristics), politics 
(political stability, democracy and trade bloc membership) and 
administration (colonial ties, language, religion and legal system), 
supporting H1. H2 is also supported with the evidence that the acquired 
firms are more likely to be negatively influenced by informal institutional 
distance between EMNEs’ home and host countries in the areas of culture 
(power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism and masculinity) and 
knowledge (patents and scientific production). Cross-country differences in 
financial sector development, demography and global-connectedness 
dimensions have no impact on firm performance. Below I will discuss the 
results in details.  
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Table 13 Estimation Results of Firm Performance 
 
 ROA EPS 
PD 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 [0.006] [0.005] 
ED 0.075* 0.083** 
 [0.045] [0.035] 
FD 0.066 -0.075 
 [0.074] [0.065] 
AD 0.006 0.072** 
 [0.019] [0.029] 
KD -0.095** -0.005 
 [0.047] [0.030] 
GCD 0.048 -0.085 
 [0.071] [0.076] 
DD -0.026 0.007 
 [0.031] [0.021] 
CD -0.037** -0.041** 
 [0.016] [0.017] 
GD (x 10
-3
) -0.021 -0.0015** 
 [0.005] [0.005] 
Number of employees (x 10
-3
) -0.021 -0.024 
 [0.013] [0.018] 
NA 0.013 0.000 
 [0.018] [0.019] 
R
2
 0.263 0.404 
N 90 110 
Industry dummy included in the estimation. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, # < 0.12 
 
5.5 Discussion 
 
Firm performance associated with CBMAs has been widely investigated, 
drawing insights mostly from accountancy, finance, economics and 
management (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). However, the academic focus on 
EMNEs’ CBMAs from the institutional perspective is very limited. In the 
meantime, EMNEs have played a significant role in international business in 
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the global landscape, especially as their CBMA activities are becoming 
phenomenal. My findings on acquired firm performance in EMNEs’ 
CBMAs have several theoretical contributions. First, I adopt the 
institution-based view to firm performance research. Although there are 
extensive studies on firm performance of CBMAs, they mainly focus on 
finance, stock, and other firm-level contexts (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). 
Internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 2009) and the resource-based 
view (Buckley et al., 2014) are the main leading theories in studies of firm 
performance. I expand the view from the institutional perspective. Given the 
fact of significant influence of institutional distance between EEs and DEs, 
my comprehensive framework compensates the research pool with 
institutional approach. To understand the institutional distance between host 
and home countries is the key to the success of EMNEs’ CBMAs. Second, 
unlike the previous studies, I cover multiple-host and multiple-home 
countries to provide unbiased results of institutional distance and firm 
performance. My examination proves that institutional distance is 
potentially good variance to most EEs’ and DEs’ interactions. Furthermore, 
my findings broaden the theoretical context with the insight of different 
aspects of institutional distance. I distinguish them into formal institutions 
and informal institutions by following the institution theory (North, 1990). 
Surprisingly, the results show that different types of institutions have 
different effects on acquired firm performance. The formal aspect of 
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institutional distance tends to have a positive effect on acquired firm 
performance. To be more specific, on balance, between the extra costs 
EMNEs incur to familiarize themselves with the host country institution and 
the benefits they gain from operating in DEs with strong formal institutions, 
and that acquired DMNEs receive strong financial support and attention 
from EMNEs, large formal institutional distance therefore may bring good 
firm performance. Meanwhile, sometimes acquirers find it hard to absorb 
and transfer the advanced knowledge. As a result, the large knowledge 
distance forces acquirers to invest in their own R&D to digest the 
knowledge transfer from acquired firms, instead of the R&D reinvestment in 
acquired firms, which leads to a decline in acquired firm performance. 
Unfamiliarity with the culture between EMNEs and DMNEs may bring 
time-consuming and costly organizational learning and cultural 
inter-conflict at both managerial and individual levels, so the informal 
aspect of institutional distance is negatively related to acquired firm 
performance.  
 
The research findings have significant implications for both corporate 
managers and policy makers. First of all, the results suggest that economic 
distance between host and home country has a significant and positive effect 
on the performance of acquired firms, which means that larger economic 
distance results in better performance of acquired firms. The economic 
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distance in the dataset is associated with the volume of national imports and 
exports. The larger economic distance therefore means acquired firms can 
hopefully have contacts with geographically enlarged markets around the 
globe due to the larger economic distance. When CBMAs happen, the 
acquired firms and acquirer firms can share resources that they possess with 
each other, with the purpose of enhancing communication and interaction, 
improving the integration process, and facilitating technological and 
managerial skill and knowledge sharing and exchanges. Such resource 
sharing includes the sharing of product markets around the globe. As a result, 
the enlarged global markets will help with the growth in market share of 
acquired firms, which can improve firms’ returns and performance.  
 
Second, the findings indicate that political distance between host and home 
country positively influences the performance of acquired firms, which 
means that larger political distance results in better performance of acquired 
firms. When the political distance gets larger, the poorer political institutions 
in the home countries will push firms to escape and seek more efficient 
political institutions and supporting policies overseas in the host countries. 
In the meantime, the relatively more attractive political institutions and 
policies in host countries can produce pulling effects. as they can offer more 
efficient political institutions and help acquirer firms diversify political risks 
and uncertainties generated from their home countries. As a result, in order 
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to enhance the capabilities and significance of the position of acquired firms 
and build them into “overseas headquarters”, the acquirer firms will invest 
heavily into the acquired firms with the purpose of diversifying risks and 
uncertainties generated from home countries.  
 
Third, the results suggest a positive and significant relationship between 
administrative distance between host and home country and acquired firms’ 
performance in earnings per share, which means that larger administrative 
distance results in better performance of acquired firms. The administrative 
distance in the dataset is associated with the legal system in a country. The 
larger administrative distance means a larger distance in legal institutions 
between host and home countries. The poorer legal institutions in home 
countries are associated with issues such as violations of property rights and 
illegal imitations, which will produce bad effects on firm performance of 
EMNEs. Therefore, when there are poor legal institutions present in home 
countries, EMNEs will escape and seek better legal protection on their 
innovation outcomes such as patents, new products and new processes in 
host countries where there are more efficient and stronger legal institutions 
and protection on returns from R&D. When this happens, EMNEs will 
transfer their innovation fruits and intellectual properties to host countries 
and acquired firms in order to get better and more efficient protection there. 
Acquired firms with transferred innovation fruits from acquirer firms can 
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expect improved returns and performance as the quality of their products 
and their reputation and operational efficiency will become better.  
 
Fourth, the findings reveal that the knowledge distance between host and 
home country generates a significant and negative impact on the acquired 
firms’ performance in ROA, which means that larger knowledge distance 
results in worse performance of acquired firms. When large knowledge 
distance is present between host and home countries, the technological gap 
is normally large as well. However, with a large technological gap between 
acquirer firms and acquired firms, the EMNEs’ firms (acquirer firms) may 
not have enough absorptive capacity to learn and assimilate the 
technological spillovers from acquired firms in host countries. Then the 
acquirer firms have to invest into their own R&D with the purpose of 
enhancing R&D capability and catching up with the acquired firms, and 
have to reduce the amount of funds and R&D personnel transferred to 
acquired firms in a given time. Despite the fact that acquirer firms may be 
willing to integrate with acquired firms and share resources with them, the 
shortfall in technology and knowledge will inevitably result in inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness in communication and interactions. All of the above 
scenarios may result in the poorer performance of acquired firms.  
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Finally, the results of cultural distance prove that firm performance is 
significantly affected by large cultural distance between EEs and DEs. 
National culture and corporate culture cannot be ignored. Unlike the usual 
CBMAs from DEs to DEs, a large cultural gap between DEs and EEs brings 
similarities in integration and co-operation of post-CBMAs. Furthermore, 
when DEs dramatically reverse from the historical role of acquirer to the 
modern role of target, a sharp collision between DEs and EEs is encountered. 
Managerial teams in DE firms seem to lack confidence in improving firm 
performance. Losses in loyalty and valuable human resources affect the firm 
performance. No matter whether acquirer or acquired firms, an open and 
learning mind needs to be established in CBMAs. For both sides, embrace is 
the way to success of CBMAs. Managerial teams should have more 
interaction. Embedding and mixing different cultures can be 
time-consuming but necessary. In the cultural collision, more attention is 
needed to keep part of the core strategic assets – human resources. 
Otherwise, it may affect the value of the firms. 
 
In addition, influence by geographic distance between countries is 
consistent with previous findings (Clark and Pugh, 2001, Dow, 2000, 
Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Geographic distance brings more costs in 
communication and transportation. An acquired firm performs better when it 
is closer to the acquirer, which can reduce economic and administrative 
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costs (Berry et al., 2010). Coeurdacier et al. (2009) point out geography is 
negatively influential on firm performance for both sides in emerging 
countries’ overseas activities into developed countries. In general, 
geography works consistently opposite to EE CBMAs’ firm performance.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In sum, this study provides an analysis of acquired firm performance in 
EMNEs’ CBMAs from the institution-based view. Besides existing findings 
on firm performance in the stock-return-based measure, I expand the study 
with the institutional influences in firm performance. This study 
compensates existing theoretical findings with the distinguishment of 
institutional distance into formal context and informal context. With explicit 
distinguishment of formal institution context and informal institution 
context, this study theoretically enriches the academic work with clear sign 
and understanding of different functions of formal institutions and informal 
institution. 
 
In the formal institution context, it is suggested that acquired firms can 
benefit from large economic distance for a global and wider market. More 
national economic interaction such as import and export can boost acquired 
firm performance. Political distance between poor EEs and stable DEs force 
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EMNEs to escape from home institution to host institution, and acquired 
firms can receive heavy investment from EMNEs to diversify the risk and 
uncertainties in home countries. Positive administrative distance gives 
stronger investor protection in host economies. Acquired firms not only 
keep their own innovation and intellectual property rights under protection, 
but they also receive knowledge and other R&D transfer from EMNEs for 
more efficient protection. Acquired firms under better protection can expect 
improved returns and performance as the quality of their products and their 
reputation and operational efficiency will become better.  
 
In the informal institution context, although knowledge and technology can 
be protected in host economies, EMNEs still seek know-how assets to 
improve their own R&D, productivity and performance. Sometimes 
acquirers find it hard to absorb and transfer the advanced knowledge. As a 
result, the large knowledge distance forces acquirers to invest in their own 
R&D to digest the knowledge transfer from acquired firms, instead of the 
R&D reinvestment in acquired firms, which leads to a decline in acquired 
firm performance. Large cultural distance between EMNEs and DMNEs 
plays a significant negative role in acquired firm performance. Because of 
the reverse in role from historical acquirer to current target, the managerial 
level in acquired firms is culturally distant from EMNEs, and finds it hard to 
co-operate with EMNEs. Valuable employees may be lost because of the 
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fear of cultural collision. The existing successful cases of EMNEs’ CBMAs 
in DEs demonstrate an image of good cultural understanding between 
acquirers and targets.  
 
To conclude, both formal and informal institutional distances have 
significant influences on acquired firm performance in EMNEs’ CBMAs. 
Managerial teams should not only focus on corporate integration and 
co-operation, but also from institutional level. Taking an efficient adoption 
of institutional distance can help acquired firms to reduce risk and costs, and 
improve the acquired firm performance.  
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
Emerging multinational enterprises (EMNEs) have actively engaged in 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) in recent decades, especially 
acquiring firms in developed countries. Behind their impressive and 
remarkable appearance in international business since the start of 
twenty-first century, the attractiveness of advanced strategic assets in 
developed multinational enterprises (DMNEs) and the differences in 
institutional support and constraints in developed economies (DEs) and 
emerging economies (EEs) have played a significant role in EMNEs’ 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMAs). In the meantime, existing 
studies have mainly focused on the firm-level determinants of EMNEs’ 
CBMAs (Buckley et al., 2007, Shimizu et al., 2004, Buckley et al., 2014). 
However, academic research on institution context and EMNEs’ CBMAs is 
limited. This thesis aims to conduct a thorough analysis of how institutions 
matter to EMNEs’ CBMAs in the OECD countries. 
 
This thesis first presents an overview of EMNEs’ CBMAs in statistics and 
introduces the theoretical background of institution context in Chapter 2. 
This is followed by three empirical chapters on institution and EMNEs’ 
CBMAs – in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. Chapter 3 examines the 
determinants of institutional distance in EMNEs’ CBMAs by employing 
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cross-sectional data. Among all the institutional distance effects found in the 
previous chapter, I give an in-depth look into the impact of political 
institutions of both home and host countries on EMNEs’ CBMAs in Chapter 
4, because the political distance has been proven to be decisive and one of 
the key determinants. Chapter 5 explores the impact of institutional distance 
on acquired firm performance by using both firm-level and country-level 
cross-section data. This empirical chapter fills the research gap in firm 
performance of EMNEs’ CBMAs. 
 
This conclusion chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 highlights key 
findings of the thesis. Section 6.2 explains key contributions. Section 6.3 
summarizes the implications for managers and policymakers, followed by 
the discussion of limitations in section 6.4. 
 
6.1 Research Findings  
 
Employing the institution-based view, Chapter 3 examines the institutional 
distance between the home and the host countries influencing EMNEs’ 
CBMAs in the OECD countries. Hypotheses are empirically tested on the 
basis of the comprehensive framework developed by Berry et al. (2010) that 
covers eight dimensions of ID: political, economic, financial, knowledge, 
global-connectedness, demographic, administrative and cultural distance, in 
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addition to geographic distance. My empirical results confirm that when 
making strategic location decisions: 1) EMNEs respond favourably to the 
larger political, economic and knowledge distance; 2) EMNEs prefer the 
smaller global-connectedness, administrative, and cultural distance; 3) 
financial, demographic and geographic distances are found to play an 
insignificant role. To be more specific, when EMNEs undertake CBMAs in 
DEs, they pay particular attention to distance between their home and their 
host countries in the areas of politics (political stability, democracy and 
trade bloc membership), economics (economic development and 
macroeconomic characteristics), knowledge (patents and scientific 
production), global connectedness (tourism and internet use), and 
administration (colonial ties, language, religion and legal system). 
Cross-country differences in financial sector development, demography, 
culture and geography have little impact on their location decisions. 
 
Given the fact that political distance has been proven to be decisive and one 
of the key determinants, Chapter 4 explores an in-depth look into political 
institutions of both home and host countries in terms of EMNEs’ CBMAs, 
by employing the World Governance Indicators (WGIs). Estimation results 
of WGI factors show political stability (PS), regulatory quality (RQ), rule of 
law (RL) and control of corruption (CC) are statistically significant on the 
home countries’ side, with expected signs, while voice and accountability 
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(VA) and government effectiveness (GE) are statistically insignificant on the 
home countries’ side. GE, RQ, RL and CC are statistically significant on the 
host countries’ side, with expected signs, while VA and PS are statistically 
insignificant on the host countries’ side. Chapter 4 reports the following 
findings: 1) on the home country side, the home country pays more attention 
to PS, RQ, RL and CC in its domestic institution, while VA and GE are not 
influential on the home country effect; 2) on the host country side, GE, RQ, 
RL and CC in the host country have a significant function in 
decision-making of inward CBMAs, and VA and PS draw less attention.  
 
Because institutional studies mainly focus on determinants while major firm 
performance studies emphasize firm-level influential factors, I give the 
empirical evidence on the impact of formal and informal aspects of 
institutional distance on acquired firm performance by using the accounting 
measure and Berry et al.’s institutional distance framework (2010) described 
in Chapter 5. My regression results show that ED and PD statistically 
significantly and positively affect firm performance, while CD, KD and GD 
have a statistically significantly negative effect on acquired firm 
performance. The findings suggest that: 1) acquired firms are more likely to 
be positively influenced by formal institutional distance between EMNEs’ 
home and host countries in the areas of economics (economic development 
and macroeconomic characteristics), politics (political stability, democracy 
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and trade bloc membership) and administration (colonial ties, language, 
religion and legal system); 2) acquired firms are more likely to be 
negatively influenced by informal institutional distance between EMNEs’ 
home and host countries in the areas of culture (power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and masculinity) and knowledge (patents and 
scientific production); 3) acquired firms perform negatively when EMNEs 
are geographically distant; 4) cross-country differences in financial sector 
development, demography and global-connectedness dimensions have no 
impact on firm performance.  
 
6.2 Research Contributions 
 
This thesis fulfils a systematic analysis of institutional influence on 
determinants and firm performance of EMNEs’ CBMAs. Only a handful of 
institutional studies (Malhotra et al., 2009, Shimizu et al., 2004) have 
looked at EMNEs’ CBMAs. Hence this thesis enriches the research agenda 
of international business and fills the research gap through investigating 
institution and EMNEs’ CBMAs. After reviewing the existing literature and 
conducting empirical analysis, my research offers some unique institutional 
perspectives to understand EMNEs’ CBMA activities. 
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My choice to focus on EMNEs’ CBMAs in DEs is based on two reasons. 
First, the existing literature on CBMAs has focused primarily on the 
traditional players, i.e. the DMNEs. EMNEs are increasingly becoming 
important players. It is important to know how they react to institutional 
distance. Second, EEs and DEs are characterized by substantial differences 
in terms of institutions. In DEs, the established institutions provide 
sufficient protection for market behaviours and knowledge development, 
while in EEs the institutions are fragile and legal protections are inadequate, 
so there is potentially a high threat of opportunism and local firms may have 
less confidence in knowledge creation. EMNEs investing in the OECD 
countries through CBMAs represent a challenging but interesting scenario. 
 
One of the main contributions of my study is to offer a comprehensive 
framework to understand EMNEs’ CBMA location decisions through an 
investigation of the multi-dimensional nature of institutional distance. 
Linking macro institutions to micro strategic decisions with a key insight of 
institutional theory, I differentiate it into eight institutional distances. I 
suggest the firm’s strategy should be embedded in the dynamics of 
institutions. First, most of the existing literature tends to link institutional 
distance to high transaction costs, high uncertainties and risks, and strong 
barriers that constrain information flows. However, I updated the research 
agenda that not all distance dimensions have a negative impact on CBMAs, 
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and institutional distance could also be an opportunity for a firm. Unlike the 
market seeking CBMAs by DMNEs, EMNEs adopt CBMAs for 
strategic-asset seeking. Also the research enriches the research agenda that 
EMNEs acquire overseas to avoid and break the constraints at home market. 
As argued by He and Wei (2013), distant markets provide a strong basis for 
knowledge acquisition and differentiation. In fact, risk perceptions of a 
distant market may elicit a strong desire for organizational learning. The 
combination of newly acquired knowledge and skills from a well-developed 
institution with the firm’s existing firm-specific assets (FSAs) developed 
from the home country can lead to unique resource and capability creation, 
which offers a source of competitive advantage. EMNEs undertake CBMAs 
in the OECD countries not only to acquire advanced strategic assets in 
OECDs, but also to escape the political constraints that they face at home. 
Frequent global connectedness with more bilateral tourism and the fast 
development of the internet breaks many constraints associated with time 
and space and makes information circulation extensive and transparent, 
which leads to more CBMAs and reduces the negative effect of large 
geographic distance. Second, I also suggest that some aspects of 
institutional distance can be insignificant in EMNEs’ CBMA location 
decisions. The negative distant-cultural affect can be moderated to 
insignificant when the colonial ties, common language, common religion 
and similar legal systems in administrative distance capture the negative 
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effect more effectively. Moreover, to add more insights in existing literature 
with the explicit consideration of different institutional distances, I found 
that more common language and active immigration can reduce the effect of 
cultural barrier. More internet use and infrastructure development offer more 
possibility of EMNEs’ CMBAs. 
 
This thesis also contributes to the literature on political institutions and 
EMNEs’ CBMAs. First, my study offers a comprehensive framework for 
both EEs as home country and DEs as host country. Existing literature 
mostly focuses on either DEs as home country, or EEs as host country. My 
study enriches existing literature that when EEs act as the home country, 
they provide sufficient protection and government of positive agreement for 
EMNEs. I also suggest that EEs taking better control of corruption and a 
“clearer” institution can reduce the unpredictable cost and market 
uncertainty to promote outward CBMAs. When DEs are host countries, my 
findings are in line with existing literature that DEs attract inward CBMAs 
because of the favourable political institutions. Moreover, my findings 
identify that not all the political institutions play a significant role in 
EMNEs’ CBMAs. Political institutions in the home and host markets have 
different effects on EMNEs’ CBMAs. This study theoretically contributes 
that effects of same political institutions of target and acquirer countries are 
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different. Scholars should consider the situation that positive political 
institutions in DEs can be negative in EEs. 
 
Existing studies on firm performance associated with CBMAs have been 
widely investigated, drawing insights mostly from accountancy, finance, 
economics and management (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). However, the 
academic focus on EMNEs’ CBMAs from the institutional perspective is 
quite limited. My research on institutional distance and acquired firm 
performance in EMNEs’ CBMAs gives an empirical aspect, with several 
contributions. First, I adopt the institution-based view to firm performance 
research. Internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 2009) and the 
resource-based view (Buckley et al., 2014) are the main leading theories in 
existing studies of firm performance, focusing on finance, stock and other 
firm-level contexts (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). I expand the view from the 
national context. Given the fact of significant influence of institutional 
distance between EEs and DEs, my comprehensive framework compensates 
the research pool with the institutional approach. To understand the 
institutional distance between host and home countries is the key to the 
success of EMNEs’ CBMAs. Second, unlike the previous studies, I cover 
multiple-host and multiple-home countries to provide unbiased results of 
institutional distance and firm performance. My examination proves that 
institutional distance is potentially good variance to most EEs’ and DEs' 
164 
 
interactions. Furthermore, my findings broaden the theoretical context with 
the insight of different aspects of institutional distance. I distinguish them 
into formal institutions and informal institutions by following the institution 
theory (North, 1990). Surprisingly, the results show that different types of 
institutions have different effects on acquired firm performance. With 
explicit distinguishment of formal institution context and informal 
institution context, this study theoretically enriches the academic work with 
clear sign and understanding of different functions of formal institutions and 
informal institution. The formal aspect of institutional distance tends to have 
a positive effect on acquired firm performance. The informal aspect of 
institutional distance is negatively related to acquired firm performance. 
 
6.3 Research Implications 
 
The findings of this research have important policy implications for 
policymakers and practitioners. My first study suggests that policymakers 
and managers should not only focus on firm strategic assets seeking, but 
should also consider the decision-making at the institutional level for a 
comprehensive approach. Governments of home and the host countries 
should pay attention to political institutions. The awareness of political, 
economic and knowledge distance between home and host countries could 
lead EMNEs to merge or acquire firms in more distant countries and benefit 
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from economic gains that can compensate for perceived risks and 
uncertainties associated with distant countries. The EE home country 
government should try to improve the global-connectedness and 
administrative distances with developed countries. For managerial levels, 
this comprehensive study suggests that location choice of EMNEs’ CBMAs 
should be based on the evaluation of optimum risk-adjusted benefits. There 
are benefits as well as costs associated with undertaking CBMAs in an 
institutionally distant country. It is crucial for managers to understand the 
systematic institutional differences between countries. It is only through 
making sense of these differences that EMNEs can adapt their 
organizational practices and internal procedures to managing these 
differences and ensuring organizational success. EMNEs may find that it is 
relatively easy to adapt their practices and routines in response to distance in 
political, economic and knowledge dimensions, as they have positive 
impacts on CBMAs. Meanwhile, because global-connectedness and 
administrative distances have negative impacts on CBMAs, managerial 
adaptation to institutional pressures along these dimensions may be more 
challenging. 
 
This research also suggests the policymakers and practitioners for the 
importance of political institutions, which, however, has previously been 
neglected. Supportive go-out policies and effective government service in 
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EEs can encourage EMNEs’ CBMAs for less cost. EEs’ governments should 
try to reduce the domestic political constraints, and provide better conditions 
for EMNEs, in order to help EMNEs’ cross-border operations for more 
profit. For DEs’ governments, I suggest that keeping the reputation of 
protective and supportive institutions can attract more inward CBMAs. DEs 
should not fear foreign investment and reduce local protectionism. EMNEs 
undertake CBMAs to gain advanced know-how assets, which would benefit 
DMNEs with a new, large market in return. For the managerial level of 
EMNEs and DE firms, strategic assets and human resources at the firm level 
are no longer the only main determinants. Managers should evaluate the 
political institutions when they are choosing locations and searching for 
targets. Besides the benefit from good institutions in DEs, EMNEs’ 
managers should be aware that the resistance from DE’s governments can be 
vital and costly. Synergistic effect and congregation of EMNEs’ CBMAs in 
DEs are becoming more and more popular when national reorganization 
improves. 
 
The findings of the study of firm performance will help policymakers and 
practitioners to understand the importance of institutional distance in 
post-acquired firm performance. The findings suggest to policymakers and 
governments that more national economic interactions should be made to 
help target firms for better performance. In order to attract more attention 
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and investment from acquirers, DEs should keep enhancing the stable and 
regulated institutions for firms, because acquirers from EEs consider these 
as risk divarication and stable investment environment. Beside the 
reputation of less stability and uncertainty of DEs, acquired firms can 
benefit from their stronger investor protection, because the investor 
protection not only helps acquired firms to keep their own innovation and 
intellective property protection under protection, but they also receive 
knowledge and other R&D transfer from EMNEs for more efficient 
protection. As a result, acquired firms under better protection can expect 
improved returns and performance as the quality of their products and their 
reputation and operational efficiency will become better. Managerial teams 
in both acquirers and acquired firms should pay attention to the cultural 
distance, because EMNEs are normally culturally distant from DMNEs. 
Both sides may find it hard to co-operate. Valuable employees may be lost 
because of the fear of cultural collision. Hence, the study suggests that 
managerial teams should have more interaction. For example, managers can 
visit or take positions in the other party. Embedding and mixing different 
cultures can be time-consuming but necessary. Previous successful cases 
confirm this as an effective way. In the cultural collision, more attention is 
needed to keep part of the core strategic assets – human resources.  
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6.4 Research Limitations and Future Research 
 
Although this thesis contributes to the literature on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), with particular eyes on the new and fast-growing EMNEs’ CBMAs, 
there are some limitations to this study. 
 
At first, this study fails to distinguish the type of CBMAs as horizontal or 
vertical, majority or minority and by types of industry. The databases used 
in this study cannot provide that kind of distinction. For example, evidence 
from previous literature suggests that manufacturing firms are more 
sensitive to formal institutions, and the service industry focuses more on 
informal institutions such as the human dimension (Shimizu et al., 
2004).With the distinction of the types of CBMAs, results may be more 
accurate, and certain industries or type of CBMAs may be more sensitive to 
some of the institutional distances. The influences of institutional distances 
may be enhanced or different, compared with the results in my study. Future 
studies with these distinctions can give particular attention to certain types 
of CBMAs, or compare the different influential levels of institutional 
distance on different types of CBMAs.  
 
In the meantime, it can be observed that more than half of the CBMA cases 
in the dataset of this research are made by major emerging economies. Deals 
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by BRIC (Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China) countries take up to 60% 
of total number of EMNEs’ CBMAs. This can raise two questions: 1) can 
they present for all the emerging economies? 2) as the institutional distance 
between BRIC and OECD may not be similar to the institutional distance 
between small EEs and the OECD, will the results on the latter ones tell a 
different story? Further studies can focus on other active emerging countries 
which are recognized as new and rising powers in EEs, such as the MINT 
countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey). 
 
Moreover, according to the limitation of data availability, this research only 
considers the number of EMNE CBMAs as dependent variables in the first 
and second empirical studies. However, previous studies suggest that the 
volume of FDI can be another indicator of the institutional studies (Benassy 
- Quere et al., 2007, Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). In other words, future 
research using the volume of EMNE CBMAs as the second dependent 
variable can enhance the existing findings in this research.  
 
Further, some of the important firm-level factors should also be considered. 
It is confirmed that EMNEs’ CBMAs will be less costly and 
time-consuming when either side of the acquirers or acquired firms have 
previous experience in CBMAs. This can also benefit the firm performance, 
especially in cultural distance (Liu and Buck, 2009). Moreover, the size of 
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CBMA deals can also be influenced by institutional distance. Policymakers 
may pay more attention to a particular CBMA deal when it accounts for 
large amounts of currency. Unfortunately, the dataset in this research cannot 
provide such information. Further studies with more adequate data 
availability can add more into the existing research findings.  
 
Additionally, some of the measures used in this study can be improved. In 
the first and third research, cultural distance in this research adopts 
Hofstede’s four-dimension framework. It is also long argued that this 
measure overlaps with other institutional distance. For example, colonies tie 
captured by administrative distance can have the same function as cultural 
distance. Geographic distance which adopts the great circle distance 
between geographic centres of countries, can be improved by the flight 
duration and aviation distance, because flight duration is more accurate and 
effective to measure the geographic influence on business activities. In the 
second research, although Kaufmann et al. who developed it point out that 
the chances of overlap among the governance indicators are reduced to 
minimal, the WGI index used in the second empirical study is admitted to be 
correlated among each of the six governance indicators by previous scholars 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2002). However, these indices derive from 
inherently related measures within government and human capital. Social, 
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political and economic studies accept the existence of this multicollinearity 
and try to improve in social, political and economic studies. 
 
Finally, further research can be extended based on the third empirical study 
of firm performance. As discussed above, although the short-term 
performance of acquired firms can be biased, the long-term measure can 
confirm and adjust the existing findings of this research. In addition, 
EMNEs acquire DE firms to enhance their own comparative advantages, 
eventually to improve the firm performance of the acquirers, so I believe 
that future research on acquirers’ firm performance is worthwhile. 
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Appendix 1 List of Emerging Economies and OECDs 
for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
 
There are different lists for “emerging economies” produced by the IMF, the 
Emerging Market Global Players project at Columbia University, the FTSE 
Group, MSCI Barra, Standard and Poor’s, Dow Jones, BBVA Research, 
MasterCard and the Economist. To ensure the comprehensiveness of the 
study, I included all countries that have appeared in these lists. They are: 
Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, 
Vietnam. 
 
And all involving host countries that have appeared in the OECD list as 
follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland-Republic, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia,  
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
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Appendix 2 List of Emerging Economies and OECDs 
for Chapter 5 
 
There are different lists for “emerging economies” produced by the IMF, the 
Emerging Market Global Players project at Columbia University, FTSE 
Group, MSCI Barra, Standard and Poor’s, Dow Jones, BBVA Research, 
MasterCard and the Economist. To ensure the comprehensiveness of the 
study, I list all involving home countries that have appeared in these lists as 
follows: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
Venezuela, Vietnam. 
 
And all involving host countries that have appeared in the OECD list as 
follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland-Republic, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States  
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Abbreviations 
 
AD Administrative Distance 
BRIC Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China 
CBMAs  Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions  
CC Control of Corruption 
CD Cultural Distance 
DD Demographic Distance 
DE  Developed Economy  
DMNE Developed Multinational Enterprise 
ED Economic Distance 
EE  Emerging Economy  
EMNE  Emerging Multinational Enterprise  
EPS  Earnings per Share  
FD  Financial Distance 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment  
FSAs  Firm-Specific Assets/Resources  
GCD Global-connectedness Distance 
GD  Geographic Distance 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GE Government Effectiveness 
GLM Generalized linear model 
IB International Business 
IBV  Industry-Based View  
ID Institutional Distance 
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights  
IT  Institutional Theory  
KD Knowledge Distance 
MINT Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey 
MNE  Multinational Enterprise  
NA Net Assets 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
OFDI  Outward Foreign Direct Investment  
PD Political Distance 
PS Political Stability 
RL Rule of Law 
ROA  Return on Assets  
RQ Regulatory Quality 
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
TA Total Assets 
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UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development  
VA Voice and Accountability 
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators 
WIR  World Investment Report  
WTO  World Trade Organization  
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